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
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Sealane Defense:
An Emerging Role for the JMSDF?

by

Ted Shannon Wile

September 1981

Thesis Advisor:

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Sealane Defense:
An Emerging Role for the JMSDF?

by

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

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ABSTRACT

Japan's economy, the third largest in the world, is totally dependent on the sea lines of communication for the importation of 90 percent of its energy requirements and strategic metals and for over 70 percent of its food. Despite the importance of the sealanes to Japanese security, the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) remains incapable of protecting those sealanes against interdiction. Although the JMSDF is currently the seventh largest navy in the free world, future expansion has been stymied by Japan's steadfast refusal to increase defense spending above one percent of the GNP. Long-range procurement plans focus on qualitative improvements with a primary emphasis on anti-submarine warfare, a strategy which could foreshadow a building program to enable the JMSDF to control the vital sea lanes. On the other hand, political and domestic constraints on a strong military indicate a continuing reliance on the United States for Japan's security. This study examines the factors affecting military decision-making in Japan, looks into the problems and realities of sealane defense and analyzes the future prospects for the JMSDF.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION -----	11
II.	EVOLUTION OF THE MARITIME SDF: 1945 TO PRESENT -	13
	A. DEMOBILIZATION -----	13
	B. THE BEGINNING -----	17
	C. BUILD-UP PLANS -----	22
	D. NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM OUTLINE -----	28
	E. CAPABILITIES -----	29
	F. TRENDS -----	37
III.	POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS ON A STRONG MILITARY -----	39
	A. OVERVIEW -----	39
	B. DOMESTIC CONSIDERATIONS -----	40
	1. Constitutional Constraints -----	40
	2. Defense Spending -----	44
	3. Public Opinion--Changing Attitudes -----	48
	4. Decision-Making and the Government -----	56
	a. Method -----	56
	b. Position -----	58
	5. Liberal-Democratic Party -----	62
	6. Opposition Parties -----	64
	7. Business and Industry -----	66
	8. Mass Media -----	70
	C. FOREIGN POLICY -----	71
	1. General -----	71

2.	United States -----	72
3.	Soviet Union -----	79
4.	People's Republic of China -----	83
5.	Korea -----	85
6.	Southeast Asia and ASEAN -----	86
IV.	INTERNATIONAL TRADE, THE KEY TO JAPAN'S STRENGTH -----	88
A.	RESOURCE DEPENDENCE -----	88
B.	JAPANESE RESPONSES -----	90
V.	THREATS TO SEA-LANE SECURITY -----	98
A.	PERSPECTIVES ON SEA-LANE INTERDICTION -----	98
B.	SOVIET PACIFIC FLEET -----	102
C.	SOVIET OPTIONS -----	102
D.	THIRD WORLD NAVIES -----	109
E.	JAPANESE PERCEPTIONS OF THE THREAT -----	116
VI.	SEA-LANE DEFENSE: A RATIONAL CHOICE? -----	121
A.	HISTORICAL BACKGROUND -----	121
B.	MODERN STUDIES -----	122
C.	SEKINO PLAN -----	126
D.	SHILLING PLAN -----	133
E.	TAOKA PLAN -----	137
F.	SUMMARY -----	138
VII.	CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR UNITED STATES' POLICY -----	141
	FOOTNOTES -----	154
	BIBLIOGRAPHY -----	165
	INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST -----	174

LIST OF TABLES

2-1.	Build-up Plans -----	30
2-2.	Ships of the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force as of 1980 -----	31
2-3.	Aircraft of the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force, by Type, 1978 -----	32
2-4.	MSDF Construction Starts -----	33
3-1.	Defense Budget from 1970 to 1981 in Respect to the Gross National Product and the General Account (Billions of Yen) -----	46
3-2.	Top Six Arms Producers -----	68
4-1.	Percent of Total Imports of Selected Materials Carried Over Different Sea Routes, 1968 -----	96
4-2.	Percent of Strategic Material Consumption Imported (net), 1975 -----	97
4-3.	International Sea-Borne Traffic Entering Japan -	97
5-1.	Soviet Pacific Fleet OOB (as of June 1980) -----	103
5-2.	Naval Order of Battle for Nations Adjacent to Japanese Sea-lanes -----	113

GLOSSARY OF MILITARY TERMS

AO	Auxiliary, Oiler. Replenishment ship carrying fuel.
AOE	Auxiliary, Oil and Explosives. Replenishment ship carrying fuel and ammunition.
ASROC	Anti-Submarine Rocket. Rocket-thrown torpedo.
ASW	Anti-Submarine Warfare.
CINCPAC	Commander in Chief, Pacific.
CIWS	Close-in Weapons System. Commonly the Phalanx gatling-gun system for air defense.
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations.
COMNAVFE	Commander of Naval Forces, Far East.
COM 13	Commander, Thirteenth Naval District.
Corvette	Naval patrol craft usually smaller than a frigate but larger than a patrol craft.
DD	Destroyer. Ship-type designed primarily for anti-submarine warfare.
DDA	Destroyer. Anti-aircraft modification.
DDG	Destroyer, Guided-missile equipped.
DDH	Destroyer, Helicopter equipped.
DDK	Destroyer, anti-submarine version.
DE	Destroyer Escort. Ship-type designed for anti-submarine warfare, generally smaller than a destroyer.
DESFLT	Destroyer Flotilla.
Flotilla	One echelon above the squadron level in naval organization.
FPB	Fast Patrol Boat.

Hedgehog	Multi-barreled anti-submarine depth charge launcher.
IJN	Imperial Japanese Navy.
JMSDF/MSDF	Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force
K-gun	Depth charge throwing gun, World War II.
LAMPS	Light Airborn Multi-Purpose System. Anti-submarine helicopter.
LSSL	Landing Support Ship, Light. Patrol gunboat.
LST	Landing Ship, Tank. Amphibious assualt vessel.
MAD	Magnetic Anomaly Detector. Short range localization system for anti-submarine warfare.
MSA	Maritime Safety Agency.
MSC	Minesweeper, Coastal.
OKEAN	Code name given to specific Soviet worldwide naval exercises.
OOB	Order Of Battle. Servicable military equipment.
OPNAV	Office of Naval Operations
PACFLT	Pacific Fleet.
PC	Patrol Craft, gun equipped.
PF	Patrol Frigate. Ship type for anti-submarine warfare.
PT	Patrol craft, Torpedo equipped.
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense.
SLOC	Sea Lines of Communication.
SS	Submarine, diesel-electric.
SSBN	Submarine, Ballistic missile eqipped, Nuclear powered.
SSM	Surface-to-Surface Missile.
Subchasers	Small coastal patrol vessels used for anti-submarine warfare.

TASS	Towed Acoustic Surveillance System. Passive sonar array used for underwater detection.
USCG	U.S. Coast Guard.
VDS	Variable Depth Sonar.
V/STOL	Vertical/Short Take-Off and Landing aircraft.
Y-gun	Depth charge throwing gun, World War II.

I. INTRODUCTION

Japan is an industrial giant with a Gross National Product (GNP) surpassed only by the United States and the Soviet Union. Unlike these continental giants, however, Japan has virtually no natural resources of her own. Her survival is totally dependent on foreign trade and on her searoutes of communication, over which passes 90 percent of her energy supplies, over 95 percent of her strategic metals and 70 percent of her food.

Despite the importance of these searoutes, the maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) is incapable of insuring the safety of merchant shipping in the face of searoute interdiction by a hostile power. Despite constant pressure from the United States to increase her defense spending and to take a larger role in regional security, Japan has refused steadfastly to spend more than one percent of her GNP on defense.

Nevertheless, the MSDF, which came into being after World War II as a small minesweeping force, has gradually expanded in both size and capability to its current position as the world's seventh largest navy. In 1976, the Cabinet approved the National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) which was developed to meet Japan's long-range defense needs. The NDPO, which stressed qualitative improvements and modernization over quantitative increases, is now scheduled for attainment in 1987.

This paper will attempt to determine the future prospects for the MSDF. Some questions to be examined will be the adequacy of the NDPO to fulfill Japan's defense needs. In light of the shift in public opinion from postwar pacifism to current attitudes more tolerant of defense, will the MSDF continue to expand and become more important in the regional military balance? Will the MSDF develop the capability to defend, unilaterally, the vital sealanes against interdiction? What are the domestic and international implications of increased Japanese military strength? Just how critical is sealane defense to Japan's security? Is sealane defense a possible and rational choice? Are the current qualitative improvements in the MSDF the first steps in a long-range plan for sealane defense?

In answering these questions it is hoped that insights into Japanese objectives will be realized, making it possible to better see the path for an effective American policy for the 1980's and 1990's.

II. EVOLUTION OF THE MARITIME SDF: 1945 TO PRESENT

A. DEMOBILIZATION

On August 14, 1945, Japan accepted the Potsdam Proclamation which defined the terms for the unconditional surrender and the occupation of Japan, thus bringing an end to hostilities in the Pacific. This was followed on August 29 by President Truman's "Initial Post-Surrender Policy" in which General MacArthur, as Supreme Allied Commander (SCAP), was to insure that:

Japan will be completely disarmed and demilitarized. The authority of the militarists and the influence of militarism will be totally eliminated from her political, economic, and social life. Institutions expressive of the spirit of militarism and aggression will be vigorously suppressed...

Disarmament and demilitarization are the primary tasks of the military occupation and shall be carried out promptly and with determination...

Japan is not to have an army, navy, airforce, secret police organization, or any civil aviation. Japan's ground, air, and naval forces shall be disarmed and disbanded and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters, the General Staff and all secret police organizations shall be dissolved. Military and naval material, military and navy vessels and military and naval installations, and military and civilian aircraft shall be surrendered and shall be disposed of as required by the Supreme Commander.¹

The dismantling of what, only a few months earlier, had been one of the world's most powerful navies, was set in motion. Submarines and aircraft were sunk or destroyed. Some 135 vessels were given away to Allied navies and others were transferred to the Merchant Marine. A total of seven carriers, three battleships, twelve cruisers and three auxiliaries were scrapped.²

One sector of the Japanese navy, however, went on relatively unnoticed and untouched. As early as August 15, this segment of the Japanese navy was, under U.S. direction, sweeping some of the 100,000 American and Japanese planted mines from coastal waters. Sweeping operations took place continuously until September 1, when U.S. Forces ordered a temporary halt in order to coordinate plans with participating U.S. units. Operations resumed eleven days later and were an ongoing project through 1969. The Imperial Navy force which began sweeping in 1945 consisted of 350 vessels and 10,000 men under the command of Captain Kyuzo Tamura. By May 1946, all U.S. minesweepers had been withdrawn and operations were entirely Japanese. Although force levels were progressively reduced and personnel were officially designated as civilians, they were exempted from many of the restrictions and demobilization plans. Significantly, due to the nature of minesweeping operations, the force remained armed. Through continuing operational experience and with a reduction in U.S. forces, by 1949, "...the Japanese minesweeping force was the largest and most capable in the western Pacific, expert in handling complex, modern mines."³

On May 3, 1947, the Japanese Constitution came into being. The impact of this document, specifically Article IX, has had far-reaching effects on the development of the Japanese navy. The origin and intent of the wording in Article IX is still open to debate, but the popular and functional interpretation was the recognition that sea forces as well as other war

potential will not be maintained as a means of settling international disputes.⁴

In the aftermath of World War II, illegal immigration and smuggling from Korea caused considerable concern because of Japan's faltering economy. An outbreak of cholera in Korea in 1946 and the resulting influx of refugees spurred SCAP to action. Based on a survey conducted in 1946 by Captain Frank Meals, the USCG commandant, a centralized organization was set up to handle coastal law enforcement and 28 former Japanese navy auxiliary subchasers were transferred to the Ministry of Transportation on August 28, 1947. With a nucleus consisting of these 28 small patrol vessels, the Maritime Safety Agency came into being on May 1, 1948, with Cabinet and Diet approval of the Maritime Safety Board Law. The final bill restricted the Maritime Safety Agency in terms of:

- a. total number of personnel, which was not to exceed 10,000;
- b. total number of vessels, which was not to exceed 125; the total tonnage of vessels which was not to exceed 50,000 gross tons;
- c. speed of vessels, which was not to exceed fifteen knots;
- d. armament of vessels, which was limited to small arms for maritime safety officials;
- e. operating areas of vessels, which was limited to the high seas adjacent to Japan.

These actions caused Raymond V. Blackman, editor of Jane's Fighting Ships to comment:

A fleet of 125 vessels, to include a number of ex-minesweepers and other war-built craft, is being formed to police Japanese waters for fishery protection and to guard against smuggling and other illegal acts...Japanese fleet is about to arise like a phoenix from its ashes. Though its present material is limited to 50,000 tons, with no single vessel displacing more than 1,500 tons, this may well prove to be the nucleus of a new navy.⁵

Although somewhat overstated in the nearterm, this prediction proved accurate as Japan embarked on a modest but comprehensive building program.

The original 28 subchasers, at 125 tons, often found themselves too slow and outgunned in respect to the smugglers and pirates they faced along their primary patrol area in the Tsushima Straits between Japan and Korea. Some vessels stationed along the northern coast, however, began providing valuable intelligence information for the United States by maintaining surveillance of and photographing Soviet warship activity in northern waters.

North Korean troops crossed the 38th parallel into South Korea on June 25, 1950. To augment their troops in Korea reeling under the communist push, Allied commanders looked for assistance from the U.S. occupation forces in Japan. To fill the vacuum created by the U.S. troop reduction in Japan, General MacArthur, on July 8, 1950, authorized Prime Minister Yoshida to create a 75,000 man National Police Reserve and to expand the Maritime Safety Agency (MSA) to 8,000 men. Coastal patrols of the MSA were redirected to provide for the detection and prevention of amphibious movements against Japanese shores.

Having launched a successful landing at Inchon, MacArthur wanted a second landing at Wonsan on the east coast of the Korean Peninsula to spearhead a thrust into North Korea. Anticipating heavy minefields in the coastal approaches to Wonsan and with a U.S. navy minesweeping force in the western Pacific consisting of only 10 ships, the U.S. Navy turned to

the Maritime Safety Agency. Rear Admiral Arleigh Burke, personally representing the CNO, requested the services of the MSA minesweeping force. After some hesitation, Prime Minister Yoshida went along with U.S. desires and on October 10, 1950, Japanese ships under the command of Captain Tamura began sweeping operations off Korea. Forty-six Japanese minesweepers saw action between October 10 and December 12, 1950. Two ships were sunk, one by a mine detonation and a second by grounding. One Japanese sailor was killed and eight wounded in the sinkings.⁶ As the war tempo decreased, units were sent home and the MSA Korean detachment was formally disbanded on December 15, 1950.

B. THE BEGINNING

Even as the forty-eight nation Peace Treaty and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty were being signed in San Francisco, work was underway planning the organization of a postwar navy. The so-called "Y-Committee," headed by Admiral Yamamoto and Director General of the MSA Yanagisawa, had strong support and backing from Admiral Arleigh Burke, Admiral Turner Joy (COMNAVFE), General Matthew Ridgeway (SCAP), and Admiral Radford (CINCPAC). Their plan called for the formation of a Coastal Security Force, officially under MSA but with an autonomous administration which could become separate at any time. Officers would be recruited from ex-naval personnel and the Coastal Security Force would become a de facto navy.

It was within this framework that on October 19, 1951, SCAP offered Japan the use of 68 vessels. Eighteen of the ships were U.S. made patrol frigates (PF) of 1,400 tons that had been returned to the U.S. by the USSR at the end of the war. These units were located in Yokosuka harbor undergoing repairs. The remaining 50 units, large support landing ships (230 tons), were still in the United States.

The MSA was not restricting its efforts solely to the procurement of U.S. aid. By 1952, MSA assets included five ex-Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) destroyer escorts which were being used as weather ships, 40 patrol vessels, 42 minesweepers, and 9 support vessels. In addition, six of a projected fifteen coastal cutters had been built locally. A new construction program "which foreshadows the re-birth of the Imperial Japanese Navy" included three prototype destroyers for ocean, sea and coastal patrols (2,000, 1,200 and 800 tons, respectively).⁷ Japan's maritime capabilities at this point were meager at best. Although Lloyd's listed Japan's merchant marine as 1,529 vessels at 2.18 million tons, the MSA was only lightly armed and incapable of sustained, at-sea operations. Anti-submarine and antiaircraft capabilities were non-existent.

The U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty went into effect on April 28, 1952, and on July 30 the plans of the Y-Committee became reality with the promulgation of the National Safety Agency Law which established the Coastal Security Force and the Maritime Safety Agency as separate entities under the National Safety Agency.

The legal vehicle by which the 68 ships would be leased to Japan was the Charter Party Agreement that went into effect on December 27, 1952, and on January 14, the first six frigates and three landing craft were transferred. The Agreement provided the vessels on a five-year loan subject to renewal for an additional five years.

The 18 Tree-class patrol frigates with three 3-inch guns and antiaircraft cannons and the 50 Flower-class (LSSL) gunboats with a single 3-inch gun finally provided some firepower for the Coastal Security Force. Planners pursued an optimistic course. Construction began on sixteen ships totalling 9,000 tons including five frigates, two with 5-inch guns. Two 5-year plans were developed for consideration, one calling for 165 ships at 340,000 tons, including ten aircraft carriers and five cruisers; while the second plan was more modest, deleting the aircraft carriers and calling for 95 ships of 148,000 tons.⁸


The signing of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement on March 8, 1954, provided a new avenue for strengthening Japanese maritime forces. Under the Agreement, a loan by the United States to Japan, of 159 ships, was negotiated. The package included eight destroyers, one submarine, four tank landing ships (LST) and numerous minesweepers and support ships.⁹ Seventeen of those ships, including two destroyers (Gleaves-class) and two destroyer escorts (Bostwick-class), were transferred in October. Most of these ships and others transferred on lease would be reclassified by the U.S. as being in excess of requirements prior to the expiration of

the loan. They would then be stricken from U.S. rolls and in effect become a grant-in-aid to Japan.

As a result of a growing awareness for the need to provide for national defense against external aggression and in consideration of the political sensitivity of Article IX of the Constitution, the Yoshida government sought a solution less drastic than constitutional amendment. A committee consisting of the representatives of the National Safety Agency, the Liberal, Progressive and Japan Liberal parties drafted a joint proposal to totally amend the National Safety Agency Law of 1952. The Defense Agency Establishment Law and Self-Defense Forces Law were passed on June 9, 1954, and went into effect on July 1, creating the Japanese Defense Agency (JDA), the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) and retaining the Maritime Safety Board (later the Maritime Safety Agency (MSA)) as an equivalent to the U.S. Coast Guard. The original MSDF organization provided for two escort flotillas, one patrol flotilla and five regional districts. (Figure 2-1)

The next two years were dedicated to consolidating the administrative organization of the MSDF and in continuing the ambitious program of acquisitions and construction. By 1956, the MSDF counted 28 destroyer type ships, one submarine, 49 mine warfare craft and various support craft. The submarine was the Kuroshio (ex-USS Gato), on loan from the United States. The major surface combatants included two Harukaze-class destroyers (DD) at 1,700 tons and armed with three 5-inch guns, eight 40 mm anti-aircraft guns, and anti-submarine

FIGURE 2-1: MSDF Organization as of July 1, 1954
(U.S. equivalents in parenthesis)



Source: Japan Defense Agency

weapons of two hedgehog rocket launchers, two depth charge racks and eight K-guns. Three new Akebono-class frigates (DE) had also been completed. These frigates had two 3-inch guns and roughly one half the ASW armament of the Harukaze-class. Nine additional Harukaze destroyers and 14 smaller craft were under construction. Being procured from the United States were 29 LST's and 55 landing craft. Total personnel in the MSDF numbered 22,716.

The Maritime Safety Board also was keeping pace with naval expansion. They had begun arming patrol vessels in 1954 and

by 1956 possessed seven large patrol vessels (1,000 tons) and 46 smaller craft (300-500 tons). The merchant marine had also expanded to 1,770 ships of 3.73 million tons.¹⁰

C. BUILD-UP PLANS

Since its inception in 1954, the mission of the MSDF had not been explicitly defined. The minesweeping forces, still engaged in clearing World War II mines from coastal waters, were the only units with a specific purpose. Other MSDF forces, assigned to a growing number and variety of Japanese and U.S. made ships, engaged in general training toward no distinctive task. The creation of the National Defense Council in 1956 addressed the development of a national defense policy and on May 20, 1957, the Cabinet approved the "Basic National Defense Policy." The document, which is still in effect, defined the basic policy as:

The objective of national defense is to prevent direct and indirect aggression, but once invaded, to repel such aggression, thereby preserving the independence and peace of Japan founded upon democratic principles.

To achieve this objective, the Government of Japan hereby establishes the following principles;

1. To support the activities of the United Nations, and promote international cooperation, thereby contributing to the realization of world peace.
2. To stabilize the public welfare and enhance the people's love for the country, thereby establishing the sound basis essential to Japan's security.
3. To develop progressively the effective defense capabilities necessary for self-defense, with due regard to the nation's resources and the prevailing domestic situation.
4. To deal with external aggression on the basis of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements, pending more effective functioning of the United Nations in future in deterring and repelling such aggression.¹¹

As can be imagined, few arguments were settled as a result of the policy. The basic principles did not include specific tasking for the MSDF, but just as significantly, did not place any rigid restrictions on their development.

Building plans for the naval forces had been drawn up periodically since the creation of the National Safety Agency in 1952 but had been implemented only on a piecemeal basis. In 1956, the National Defense Council prepared a new five-year defense plan (1956-60) which included a fleet of 211 ships of 111,300 tons. Three weeks after the approval of the Basic Policy, the Cabinet approved a building program which incorporated the final three years of the 1956 plan. Under the officially designated First Defense Buildup Program (1958-60), the MSDF was authorized 94.5 billion yen (\$260 million) toward a goal of 124,000 tons of ships and 222 aircraft.¹² In pursuit of that goal, three new classes of destroyers were built. The Murasama (DDA) was primarily an anti-aircraft model with 5-inch and 3-inch guns and a basic ASW suite. The Ayanami (DDK) had an identical hull design but was outfitted with sonar and a full complement of ASW weapons. The third new class was the Akizuki (DD) which was built under the "offshore" program (U.S. designed/Japanese built), became the largest ship in the inventory at 2,000 tons. The Akizuki was a dual purpose destroyer with three 5-inch and four 3-inch guns and a full ASW package including sonar, torpedo tubes, two hedgehog

rocket launchers, Y-guns and depth charge racks. Further supplementing the surface navy was the acquisition of two Fletcher-class destroyers from the U.S. in 1959.

The Japanese designed Oyashio submarine (SS) became operational in 1958 and the following year, the hulls were laid down for the first two units of the more advanced but smaller Hayashio (SS) class diesel submarine (750 tons).

The MSDF maintained their excellent minesweeping force by continuing a building program to replace older vessels. Eight new minesweepers were provided in the First Buildup program. (See Table 2-1.)

The land-based ASW aircraft, the P-2, was also introduced during the First Buildup Plan. Nine squadrons of these long-range prop driven patrol planes was the initial procurement goal.

By 1960, the MSDF had 57 major surface combatants, two submarines and 142 other vessels. The Maritime Safety Agency had also continued to grow and numbered seven large patrol vessels and 97 medium and small vessels. The merchant marine had ballooned to 2,413 vessels at 5.47 million tons.

The signing of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security with the United States on January 19, 1960, signaled a leveling off of the quantitative growth of the MSDF. Long range trends would see continued improvements in ASW and the maintenance of an excellent mine warfare

capability, but the unilateral nature of the Treaty was a major factor in dampening construction programs.

The Second (1962-66) and Third (1967-71) Defense Buildup Programs called for an increase of major surface combatants from 57 to 59, however it should be noted that due to the replacement of many World War II vintage vessels by modern units, a significant qualitative improvement was realized. During this same period, substantial gains were made in ASW capabilities with the addition of 10 submarines and five squadrons of land-based ASW aircraft.

The Third Buildup Program was specifically geared toward improvements in the maritime defense capacity. Destroyers were to be equipped with surface-to-air missiles for air defense and with helicopters for anti-submarine defense. Five new submarines were authorized.

Qualitative improvements in the form of new ship classes and in weapons and sensor systems added to the overall mission capabilities of the MSDF. The Amatsukaze (DDG) introduced the U.S. built Tartar surface-to-air missile system in 1962 providing a new realm in air defense. That same year, the oiler Hamana (AO, 3,500 tons) became operational, allowing MSDF units to refuel at sea for the first time.

In 1964, the first of five Ooshio-class submarines entered the fleet. With eight torpedo tubes and displacing 1,600 tons, this was the largest and most capable submarine

to date. Construction also began on two new classes of destroyers, the Takatsuki and Yamagumo. These units were equipped with improved sonar systems and the U.S. developed ASROC (anti-submarine rocket) system. In view of these developments, the 1964-5 edition of Jane's stated that the MSDF "has risen like a phoenix and comprises newly built warships of most categories...With a now substantial fleet, Japan can take her place among the naval powers."¹³

By 1967, the merchant marine was nearing 15 million tons with over 6,000 registered ships. The Maritime Safety Agency numbered 87 patrol vessels, 211 smaller patrol craft and 52 support vessels.

In 1970, the first of the Chikugo-class destroyer escorts (DE) entered service. Eleven of these capable but relatively inexpensive vessels would eventually be built.

The final year of the Third Buildup Program brought in a new minelayer and a new class of modern minesweeper. Construction began on an even larger class of diesel submarine, the Uzushio-class (SS), at 1,800 tons, 236 feet long, and capable of over 20 knots submerged. Another big addition was the Haruna-class helicopter destroyer (DDH). Equipped with a modern long-range sonar, three ASW helicopters, torpedo tubes and ASROC, the Haruna represented one of the most capable ASW platforms in the world.

Advances in land-based ASW aircraft had also been made. Fourteen squadrons were in existence including updated

versions of the P-2 (J) and the unique PS-1 flying boat. The Japanese designed aircraft was capable of operating in very heavy seas and would use a submersible sonar lowered from the belly of the craft to locate submarines.

Based on the 1971 Okinawa Reversion Agreement, Okinawa was returned to Japan in 1972 greatly increasing the scope of the MSDF's sea defense zone in terms of ocean area. The Fourth Buildup Plan (1972-76) did not reflect these added responsibilities. Projected changes called for two additional major combatants, two submarines and two more squadrons of land-based ASW aircraft. A second Haruna-class DDH was completed and construction on a new multipurpose destroyer (Tachikaze DDG at 3,800 tons, 5-inch guns, Standard (U.S.) surface-to-air missile, torpedo tubes, ASROC, sonar and a variable depth sonar (VDS)) was begun.

The merchant marine reflected the Japanese economic boom of the late 60s and early 70s and their massive world seaborne trade. By 1976, almost 9,500 vessels were under the Japanese flag comprising almost 37 million tons.

The Nixon Doctrine of withdrawing U.S. forces from Asia and encouraging a more autonomous defense was just one of the factors leading to public discussions of previously taboo subjects such as defense. As a result of these developments and considerable efforts at the working level, joint U.S.-Japanese consultations on military and security matters were formally established in March 1976 through the Security Consultative Committee.

D. NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM OUTLINE

With the completion of the Fourth Buildup Plan in 1976 the Cabinet adopted the National Defense Program Outline. Unlike the previous plans, the Outline has no specific time requirements for its completion but rather depends on annual budgetary decisions as to what will be allocated in each fiscal year. To provide a means of continuity, a Mid-term Program Estimate was drafted which covers a five year period. The Estimate is used as a planning document only, and is subject to annual review. A new estimate is drafted every three years. The current Estimate was formulated in 1979 and covers the period from FY80 through FY84.

For the MSDF the National Defense Program Outline (NDP) calls for 60 major surface ships, 16 submarines and about 220 aircraft. As of 1980, shortfalls exist of one surface ship, two submarines and thirty aircraft. Based on current construction programs the NDP goal would be exceeded by 1985; however, due to expected retirements, force levels will probably remain static slightly short of NDP goals.

Since 1976 major additions have been the support ship Sagami (AOE) in 1979, the first of five Yuushio-class submarines (SS) and the first of two Shirane-class DDHs, a follow-on to the Haruna-class. The 5,000 ton Sagami (AOE) will provide a needed backup to the aging Hamana for at-sea refueling. The Yuushio (SS) represents the newest, largest and fastest addition to the Japanese submarine fleet. The

diesel-powered submarine displaces 2,200 tons and may be fitted with the submarine launched version of the Harpoon anti-ship missile in addition to her normal torpedo loadout. The Shirane (DDH), at 5,200 tons and 520 feet long, is slightly bigger than the Haruna. The Shirane will also carry three ASW helicopters, sonar, ASROC and torpedoes. Improvements will include a variable depth sonar and a towed passive sonar array (TASS). Self-defense capability will be significantly improved with the Sea Sparrow surface-to-air missile system and two Phalanx close-in weapons systems (CIWS).

E. CAPABILITIES

The primary emphasis in the MSDF is on anti-submarine warfare. Current ASW weaponry includes 59 ships, 130 land-based patrol aircraft, 60 helicopters and 14 submarines.¹⁴ The professionalism and training level in the MSDF is on a par with any in the world. Continuing qualitative improvements in equipment and technology have placed the Japanese at the forefront of ASW development.

The surface component of Japan's ASW defense is modern and the units are individually capable but they lack sufficient numbers to provide a viable convoy escort function. The ship mounted sonars are excellent, comparable with some of the best in the U.S. The second of new Shirane-class (DDH) will be outfitted with a passive towed hydrophone array (TASS) which will add dramatically to her ASW

TABLE 2-1: BUILDUP PLANS

	First 1958-60	Second 1962-66	Third 1967-71	Fourth 1972-76	NDP Outline	Strength at end FY 79 (Mar 80)
Basic Units:						
ASW Ships (mobile escort flotillas)	3	3	4	4	4	4
ASW Ships (regional divisions)	5	5	10	10	10	9
Submarines (divisions)	-	2	4	6	6	5
Minesweepers (flotillas)	1	2	2	2	2	2
Land-based ASW acft.	9	15	14	16	16	16
Major Equipment:						
ASW Surface Units	57	49	59	61	60	59
Submarines	2	7	12	14	16	14
Aircraft	220	230	240	300	220	190

Source: Japan Defense Agency

TABLE 2-2: SHIPS OF THE JAPANESE MARITIME
SELF-DEFENSE FORCE AS OF 1980

Type	Designation	Number (+ denotes under construction)
Destroyers (helicopter)	DDH	3 + 1
Destroyers (guided missile)	DDG	3 + 1
Destroyers	DD	27
Frigates	DE	15
Patrol craft (escort)	PC	11
Patrol craft (torpedo)	PT	5
Mine warfare ships	Various	34 + 4
Amphibious warfare Landing ships	LST	6 + 2
Auxiliaries	Various	20
Submarines	SS	14 + 1

Source: Jane's Fighting Ships

TABLE 2-3: AIRCRAFT OF THE JAPANESE MARITIME
SELF-DEFENSE FORCE, BY TYPE, 1978

Type	Number	Number
ASW patrol, fixed-wing	104	Trainer, fixed-wing 29
ASW, helicopter	61	Miscellaneous, fixed-wing 42
ASW and rescue, flying boat	19	Miscellaneous, helicopter <u>29</u>
Transport, fixed-wing	10	TOTAL: 294

Source: Japan Defense Agency

TABLE 2-4: MSDF CONSTRUCTION STARTS

[illegible]

Source: Japan Defense Agency and International Defense Review

capability. The introduction of this previously unavailable passive capability could mark a shift in tactical thought for the Japanese, a shift that was made in the U.S. Navy several years ago.

Shipboard ASW helicopters also provide a valuable dimension to detection and prosecution capability of the MSDF. The helicopters are equipped with a dipping sonar and also carry ASW torpedoes. One limitation is their lack of any passive detection equipment such as sonabuys or magnetic anomaly detection (MAD) gear.

Another significant limitation is the weapons available to MSDF forces. Even though most units now have the ASROC delivery system for torpedoes, the Japanese use the MK-44 which is generally considered ineffective against modern nuclear submarines. Research and development of an advanced torpedo is underway and the Japanese are expected to acquire the MK-46 torpedo from the U.S. ¹⁵

The Japanese submarine fleet, although experiencing the same difficulties as the surface fleet with the MK-44 torpedo, is highly capable and excellently suited to maintaining control of the straits around Japan. Because all the units are diesel powered, they cannot be used for any role in convoy escort or open-ocean sealane protection where high speeds and long periods of submersion are necessary.

The final component of Japan's ASW team, the land-based air arm, is undergoing rapid expansion and improvements. To

replace the older and less capable P-2J and PS-1 aircraft, P-3C Orion patrol craft have been purchased from the U.S. and Kawasaki Heavy Industries has been licensed to co-produce forty-five more aircraft through 1984. There is some speculation that the Defense Agency is considering increasing the total procurement package to 170 aircraft.¹⁶ The P-3C is equipped with torpedoes, sonabuys, radar and MAD, but its primary advantage over previous models is a sophisticated computer processing capability. The P-3C is best suited to the role of open ocean ASW and is excellent for convoy protection.

Japan is also continuing its program for shipboard helicopters and newer HSS-2B helicopters are being procured. There is also a report that the Defense Agency will buy the LAMPS III helicopter from the U.S. which would add the dimension of passive detection with sonabuys to the surface fleet.¹⁷

Air defense, both in terms of weapons and electronic countermeasures, is the MSDF's most significant weakness. While operating in coastal waters, the MSDF would have to depend on the ASDF for air cover but in an open ocean environment, they would have to rely on allied naval air forces. The Japanese have recognized this problem and air defense weapons are being installed on all new construction destroyers. These weapons, primarily the short-range Sea Sparrow missile and a close-in weapon system (CIWS), will enhance the self-defense capability of an individual unit

but can provide no protection for escorted units. Only three destroyers have the longer range Standard missile system.

The inadequacy of electronic countermeasures is also acknowledged, but has not received the same measure of response as has the lack of missiles.

Current MSDF capability in anti-surface warfare is limited to gunfire and torpedoes which provide a poor matchup against any surface-to-surface missile (SSM) equipped ship. Recognizing this deficiency and in light of the growing trend to equip ships with SSMs, the new destroyer escort Ishikari will be outfitted with the U.S.-made Harpoon missile as will two other new destroyer classes which have just begun construction. The new Yuushio-class submarine will also be given a submerged launched version of the Harpoon SSM.¹⁸ Many small countries have begun to rely on SSM equipped fast patrol boats for coastal defense, a strategy that would be well suited to Japan for control of the Straits. Although it has been reported that Japan has been working on a SSM hydrofoil design for the Fourth Buildup Plan, no official procurement plans or research and development efforts have been announced.¹⁹

Japan's mine warfare capability ranks as one of the best in the world. Their fleet of modern minesweepers is being continually renewed and in case of war, possesses the ability to keep vital coastal sealanes and harbors free to traffic.

The ability to close the Japanese straits through offensive mining is more doubtful. There is only one designated mine-layer in the inventory and most other surface vessels would require time-consuming alterations. Submarines could be used but only at the expense of torpedo capacity. ASW aircraft would also be available but their small capacity would be a serious disadvantage. A possible solution lies in the purchase of C-130 transports from the U.S. which are reported to be intended for minelaying.²⁰ A secondary problem is the adequacy of the mine stockpile. Seriously deficient in the mid-1960s, the Third Buildup Plan provided funding for mine construction but deficiencies still exist. Because of the large numbers of mines that would be required to close off the straits, the problem of planting sufficient numbers in a short time remains a serious consideration.

Another area of deficiency is that of at-sea resupply. Japan has only two ships capable of refueling ships at sea and only one of those can rearm. To provide for sustained operations or convoy escort duties, an at-sea replenishment capability is a necessity.

F. TRENDS

The Japanese seem to be satisfied with current force levels in the general sense. Emphasis is on sustaining qualitative improvements in all warfare areas rather than pushing for quantitative gains. Deficiencies have been identified in the areas of air defense and anti-submarine

warfare and corrective measures have been implemented. Deficiencies in logistics and electronic warfare remain unaddressed.

Anti-submarine warfare has dominated the MSDF's priority list for some time and no change is anticipated. Trends toward passive detection techniques and helicopter prosecution of submarine contacts will continue to develop much along the line of U.S. tactical doctrines. Submarines will continue in their role as independent units as opposed to a role in direct support and coordinated action with surface units.

Ships are generally being designed as multi-purpose platforms. Because of the close proximity of the Soviet Union and the realization that the MSDF operating area is within range of Soviet land-based aircraft, the luxury of a high-low mix cannot be afforded. Each unit must be able to provide its own self-protection regardless of the threat. This trend has contributed to a gradual increase in ship size from the 1,500 ton limit imposed by the Maritime Safety Board Law in 1948 to the 5,200 ton Shirane-class DDH.

III. POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS ON A STRONG MILITARY

A. OVERVIEW

One cannot even begin to postulate the military goals and objectives for a nation without first examining the internal decision-making process of the government. Japan is no exception. Public opinion, coalition politics, economic and business interests, all play a dominant role in the determination of Japan's military future. The aftermath of World War II created a lingering aversion to military power and has had a profound influence on the development of Japan as a unique world power, one almost devoid of military capability. Domestic questions continue to dominate all aspects of Japanese life even to the extent that international politics and foreign policy decisions are made primarily within the context of their effect on the domestic situation and economic well-being.

This chapter will examine Japanese decision-making as it relates to defense issues. The effects and importance of public opinion, coalition politics, and economic interests will be considered. The constraints imposed by the 1946 Constitution on the development of military forces also will be examined in the legal and moral aspects. The attitudes and opinions of various groups in the decision-making process also will be analyzed.

The second half of the chapter will deal with Japan's foreign policy as it relates to military concerns. Bilateral relations with the U.S. and the USSR will be discussed in addition to relationships with the other major Asian nations. Particular attention will be given to the attitudes of these Asian nations and of the superpowers in regards to their postures toward a remilitarized Japan and toward their perceptions of Japan's role in the future of Asian development and in the balance of world military power.

B. DOMESTIC CONSIDERATIONS

1. Constitutional Constraints

Just after the formation of the Japanese Cabinet under the direction of the Supreme Commander for Allied Powers (SCAP) on October 9, 1945, a committee was formed to draft a constitution under which the new nation of Japan would be governed. This committee, composed of university professors, scholars, and officials of the Cabinet Legislative Bureau, submitted their draft constitution, which was largely based on the principals of the Meiji Constitution, to SCAP in February of 1946. General MacArthur rejected the draft in its entirety with specific objection to its provision for unrestricted military forces. Brigadier General Courtney Whitney, chief of the Occupation's Government Section, was then given the task of preparing an acceptable version within MacArthur's guidelines.

A specific point of contention has been Article 9 of this Constitution which is quoted below:

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

There has been considerable debate regarding the origin of the idea for this article. MacArthur claimed that the suggestion came from Prime Minister Shidehara and that he (MacArthur) maintained from the out-set that a renunciation of war did not prevent any and all steps for self-defense. A second school maintains that the war-rejection clause was conceived by and insisted upon by SCAP.

Discussion of Article 9 in the Japanese House of Representatives focused on the right of self-defense and led to the inclusion of the phrases, "Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order," in the first paragraph and, "In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph," in the second paragraph. The amendments received no objection from SCAP and after approval of the Privy Council, House of Representatives, and House of Peers, the Constitution was sanctioned by the Emperor and was promulgated on November 3, 1946, to go into effect six months later. It was only a few years later that Hitoshi Ashida, the chairman of the Constitutional Amendment

Committee, announced that the amendments to Article 9 were designed to permit rearmament for self-defense.

Supporters of the defense forces still maintain that an opening phrase in the second paragraph qualifies the ban on maintenance of military forces to be applicable only for threatening or for settling international disputes. This interpretation has been challenged unsuccessfully three times before Japan's Supreme Court.² The Suzuki case in 1952 was dismissed with the Court finding that a judgement may be made only if there is a legal dispute between parties. The second challenge, the Sunakawa case in 1959, involved a legal dispute between parties. Persons arrested for trespassing on a U.S. military facility during a demonstration based their defense on Article 9. They argued that the Japan-United States Security Treaty of 1951, which created the U.S. military presence in general, and the base in question in particular, was unconstitutional according to Article 9; therefore no offense had been committed. The Court ruled in this case that the content of the Security Treaty of 1951, is "inseparably related to the high degree of political consideration or discretionary power on the part of the Cabinet... and on the part of the Diet which approved it. Consequently, as a rule, there is a certain element of incompatibility in the process of judicial determination on its constitutionality by a court of law..."³

The Court went on to say that the Security Treaty was instrumental in the defense and security of the nation and as such, the matter belonged under the auspices of the Diet and the Cabinet and ultimately the "sovereign" people and therefore the court had no jurisdiction in the case. In the most recent case, a district court judge in Sapporo ruled that the Self-Defense Forces were based on unconstitutional laws and were therefore extralegal. This decision sent shockwaves through the government until a higher court overturned this so-called Naganuma case in August of 1976.

Tension in the Middle East in late 1980 led to open discussion in Japan concerning the defense of sea lanes, including constitutional considerations involved in safeguarding the flow of oil from the Middle East. In November, Prime Minister Suzuki, in responding to questions in a session of the House of Representatives Special Committee on Security Affairs, made it clear that the MSDF can legally protect Japanese merchant ships on the high seas against attack.⁴ Following these remarks, in February 1981, Justice Minister Okuno stated that the Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP) may propose a constitutional amendment in the 1983 Upper House elections. Whether Okuno's statement was meant to test the political wind or was the result of diverging opinions within the LDP, is undetermined, however Prime Minister Suzuki, in a House of Representative Budget committee hearing, responded to opposition party

outrage by affirming that his administration has no intention of proposing any constitutional amendments specifically including Article 9.⁵

A public opinion poll in March 1981, indicated approval of Suzuki's stand but highlighted the magnitude of the Constitutional problem. Seventeen percent believed the SDF not to be in violation of the Constitution and 23 percent were unsure. On the question of revising the Constitution as it pertains to the renunciation of war and maintenance of armed forces, 24 percent favored Constitutional revision, while 61 percent were opposed.⁶

2. Defense Spending

Of all the many aspects of the Japanese defense policy, the one area that seems to dominate the press and public discussion is the military budget. Defense spending in Japan has been held at less than two percent of the GNP since 1955, and has been below one percent since 1967. This compares to four to six percent by the U.S. and NATO and twelve to fourteen percent for the USSR.⁷ Even though there has been a steady increase from .79 percent of GNP in 1970 to .91 percent for 1981, the basic figures have often been cited by American critics of Japanese policy who assert that Japan is taking a "free ride" for her defense. Many Japanese, on the other hand, counter that the U.S. is responsible for the Constitutional prohibitions of offensive military capability and point to the low spending

levels as proof that Japan has no aspirations toward military power.

In a recent public opinion poll conducted by Asahi Shimbun, 14 percent of those polled thought that the future security of Japan should be protected through autonomous defense and the large-scale expansion of the SDF. In the same poll, when asked if the country's defense budget should be increased, 26 percent replied that it should be increased while 57 percent disagreed.⁸

Taking a different view of the figures, one must realize that even though defense spending levels remained relatively constant as a percentage of the GNP, the growth in Japan's GNP provided for a real annual increase between 1974 and 1979 of 19 percent,⁹ not considering inflation.

The 1981 budget is set at approximately .9 percent of the GNP or \$19 billion. While proponents for a strong defense will lament that less than 18 percent is earmarked for hardware procurement,¹⁰ opponents of a strong defense will counter that the 1981 defense budget called for an overall increase of 9.7 percent while all other sectors of government were capped with 7.9 percent increase ceilings.¹¹

Amid continuing pleas from the U.S. that Japan increase her defense spending, the most recent development is the emergence of a new organization which will undoubtedly add still more confusion to the already perplexing situation. A Comprehensive National Security Council

TABLE 3-1: DEFENSE BUDGET FROM 1970 TO 1981 IN RESPECT TO THE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT AND THE GENERAL ACCOUNT (BILLIONS OF YEN)

FY	GNP	GENERAL ACCOUNT	DEFENSE BUDGET	BUDGET AS % OF CNP	DEFENSE BUDGET AS % OF GEN. ACCT.
70	72,440.0	7,949.8	569.5	.79	7.2
73	109,800.0	14,284.1	935.5	.85	6.5
76	168,100.0	24,296.0	1,512.4	.90	6.2
78	210,600.0	34,295.0	1,901.0	.90	5.5
79	232,000.0	38,600.1	2,095.5	.90	-
81	-	-	2,446.6	.91	-

Source: Japan Defense Agency

(CNSC) has been formed to assume an advisory role to the Prime Minister. Although it possesses no official function, its work roughly parallels that of the Diet-recognized National Defense Council. The CNSC-proposed Comprehensive Security Policy further clouds the defense spending issue by advocating spending five percent of the GNP for security, while stipulating a very broad interpretation of that term to include foreign aid, resource development, and cultural exchange, as well as defense. In this matter, the CNSC, representing the LDP party line, hopes to maintain maximum maneuvering room while quelling conservative pressure to increase Japan's role in regional defense on one hand, and avoiding liberal outrage on the other by refusing any significant increases in direct military spending.

In late April 1981, prior to his departure for a visit to the United States, Prime Minister Suzuki, in separate statements, vowed to keep Japan's defense spending below one percent of GNP (if the country could maintain its current annual economic growth rate) and to attain the target levels of the 1976 Defense Program Outline by the end of fiscal 1987.¹²

It is obvious that the figures can be manipulated to almost any point of view and there is no reason to doubt that the defense spending debate will rage unabated. The bottom line however, is that in absolute terms, Japan is the seventh largest defense spender in the free world. Her military

forces are weak compared to her massive economic power, but the Japanese naval force is rated as the seventh most powerful in the world and the third strongest in the Pacific, behind only the U.S. and the USSR.

3. Public Opinion - Changing Attitudes

Public opinion in Japan, as in the United States, has no formal role in the decision making process except in the election of officials and in extreme cases where demonstrations indicate that at least a portion of the population is in opposition to the relevant action. It should also be noted however, that because of the Japanese style of consensus decision-making, the ringisei model, polls and public opinion have an even greater impact on politics and decision making in Japan than in America.

Public opinion polls got their start in the Occupation era as a SCAP project to sample reactions to various programs. From this beginning in the Japanese government's Board of Information, by 1949 the National Public Opinion Research Institute had been created drawing from government agencies, newspapers, and independent research groups. The Institute was officially abolished in 1954, but continued and substantial efforts in the field have been led most notably by the Public Opinion Division of the Prime Minister's office and by the Asahi Shimbun, Japan's leading newspaper with a circulation of seven million.

The basis of current public opinion began with the rejection of the ultranationalism of World War II and the humiliation of occupation. The additional shock of being the only civilization to have suffered the detonation of atomic weapons has also had a fundamental role in formulating Japanese public opinion. From these beginnings the Japanese acquired a nuclear "allergy" and total distain for military forces. Their outlook was one of seeing the armed forces only as tools of war, not having any political or diplomatic purpose. The concept of sending troops abroad for any reason was totally rejected. There has, however, been a gradual but consistent change in these attitudes over the years with the most dramatic change taking place over the last ten years. The nature of this change cannot be described as revolutionary but rather as an evolutionary process with change occurring in extremely small increments.

Public opinion polls demonstrate rather vividly this gradual shift in attitude. In polls commissioned by the Prime Minister's office in 1972, 1975, and 1978, on the question of supporting the maintenance of the Self-Defense Forces, 73, 79, and 85 percent respectively responded in the affirmative. The same poll also asked whether Japan should rely on the U.S.-Japanese Mutual Security Treaty as an integral part of Japan's security policy. The poll showed 41, 54, and 61 percent in favor while, 16, 9, and 5 percent favored the abrogation of the pact.¹³ Polls by Asahi

Shimbun in 1978 and 1981, showed an increase from 77 percent to 83 percent in people who favored strengthening or maintaining the SDF at present level. The group favoring a reduction in the size of the SDF has remained relatively unchanged at between 6 and 7 percent.¹⁴

A changing attitude can also be seen in the form of protests and demonstrations of military activities and policies. In 1973 the Socialist Party led a massive movement to insure that Japan's American-made F-4 Phantom fighters had their bombsights removed and their in-flight refueling systems plugged to insure that the planes could be used for defensive purposes only. There was no such protest in 1978 when advanced F-15 fighter jets were delivered to Japan.

In the early 1970s it was unheard of for a Japanese warship to engage in wargames or even joint training exercises with U.S. naval units. The mid-1970s saw joint ASW exercises in Japanese contiguous waters. In 1978 two Japanese destroyers and a squadron of ASW patrol aircraft participated in multipurpose joint training exercises at Pearl Harbor. In February of 1980, Japanese ships and aircraft participated in multi-national wargames near Hawaii. In response to this participation, the Socialist Party sponsored a peaceful demonstration by 6,000 marchers at the Yokosuka naval base. This was the first such rally at the base since 1973 when it was announced that the aircraft carrier Midway would be homeported at Yokosuka. The main

thrust of the February protest was the "fear that the naval exercise may pave the way for sending the Japanese military overseas for the first time since World War II."¹⁵

Government action to dispel these attitudes came in October of 1980 when the Japanese were approached with the possibility of participating in a U.N. sponsored supervisory fleet in the Hormuz Strait. The official reply of the Suzuki government was that while participation of Japanese armed forces in an overseas peace-keeping mission was Constitutionally legal, the Japanese would not participate and would not support such an action.¹⁶

Joint exercises will continue as shown by a recent announcement of Japan's intent to participate in the multinational RIMPAC exercise scheduled for early 1982, however the volatility of the situation was demonstrated by the cancellation of joint U.S.-Japanese ASW exercises in the Sea of Japan following claims by commercial fishermen that the maneuvers had caused damage to their fishing nets.

In July of 1978, General Hiroomi Kirisu, the Chief of the Joint Staff Council (equivalent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the U.S.) was asked to resign his post because of remarks he made which intimated that Japanese defense forces, if attacked by surprise, may not wait for the Prime Minister's authorization before they returned fire.¹⁷ The General's error was mainly one of tact rather than principle. Immediately after the General's

dismissal, Prime Minister Fukuda ordered the Defense Agency to study the issues including procedures to be followed in case of attack. Although a causal relationship cannot be established, it is interesting to note that in 1980, Japanese fighter aircraft, for the first time, are being armed with air-to-air missiles when on routine patrol and when responding to possible violations of Japanese airspace. Additionally, the Maritime SDF has announced that its vessels and ASW patrol aircraft are now being armed with live torpedoes and mines.¹⁸ Previously, ships had carried only gun ammunition and patrol aircraft had been unarmed. It remains to be seen if the 74 Harpoon missile systems scheduled for procurement will be installed in ships and aircraft or be stockpiled ashore.¹⁹

In a similar case, Chairman of the Joint Staff Council, General Goro Takeda, in a magazine interview with Hoseki, expressed disagreement with official defense policies and with the ban on conscription. His comments indicated that the policy of refraining from military action until the enemy has attacked Japanese territory is simply not a realistic approach to defense of the nation. Regarding conscription, the General objected to Cabinet use of Articles 13 and 18 of the Constitution to amplify their stand against conscription. General Takeda explained that the Constitutional ban on "bondage" and "involuntary servitude" should not be equated with military service. In the face

of opposition party pressure, Takeda was asked to resubmit his resignation and was given an official warning. Prime Minister Suzuki and Director General of the Japanese Defense Agency Omura stated their resolve to tighten civilian control over the military.²⁰

Whether the actions of these two generals were designed as trial balloons or simply two men expressing their own opinions is not important. The end result is that their viewpoints received widespread press coverage and opened up avenues for public discussion. Personal sacrifice in each case is negligible since Kirisu was near retirement and Takeda had already submitted his resignation. It could be argued that the publicity enhanced their marketability for civilian employment. Nevertheless, changes in government policy did occur following Kirisu's statements and discussion surrounding the Takeda statements could generate policy changes as well.

Another indication of a changing attitude toward defense is a record number of applicants for admission to the Japanese Defense Academy. In 1978, 14,304 youths applied for admission, suggesting increasing interest in a career as an officer in the SDF, a vocation previously lacking widespread prestige in Japan.²¹ The Wall Street Journal reported that the military is getting much more coverage by the mass media, politicians are displaying models and photographs of military hardware in their offices and military

enlistments are rising indicating increased public acceptance of the military.²²

Many explanations have been offered to explain this changing of attitudes but, reduced to basic terms, the Japanese perceive the basis of their national security as becoming weaker while the threat to their security is getting stronger. The U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty has been the cornerstone of Japan's security policy since 1960, however Japan's assessment of U.S. strength and resolve in Asia has been eroded by current events. The United States' defeat in Vietnam, announced troop withdrawals from South Korea, the relative decline in U.S. economic strength (as evidenced by continuing high inflation and the decline of relative GNP), and the shifting of U.S. naval units from the Pacific to the Indian oceans have all been cited as examples of declining U.S. strength.²³ In April 1978, a poll by Yumiri Shimbun showed that only 21 percent thought that the U.S. would come to Japan's assistance if she were attacked while 38 percent said the U.S. would not.²⁴ Similar polls by the Asahi Shimbun in 1979 and 1981 revealed that 60 percent and 59 percent respectively, did not believe that the U.S. would honor its commitment.²⁵

The 1973 oil embargo highlighted for many Japanese the country's total dependence on foreign oil and the fragile nature of her sea lanes. A USIA sponsored poll in 1974 indicated that 85 percent of the university-educated public

and 78 percent of the general public knew that obtaining oil was a serious problem for Japan.²⁶ Significantly however, a 1981 poll indicated that only 18 percent would support the use of armed force for the defense of the safety of the sea lanes.²⁷

The severe attitude take by the Soviet Union in the 1977 territorial fishing rights negotiations, the massive Soviet military buildup in Asia, and the invasion of Afghanistan have all served to heighten Japan's perception of the threat. The Soviet Pacific Fleet now stands at over one and one-half million tons, twice that of the U.S. Seventh Fleet. In addition, the appearance of the aircraft carrier Minsk and modern missile cruisers give the Soviets a power projection capability previously enjoyed only by the U.S. carrier task groups. The new amphibious vessel Ivan Rogov indicated an increased Soviet emphasis on amphibious capability in the Pacific. Practice landings in the Japanese-claimed but Soviet-occupied southern Kurile islands and troop buildups on these islands (approximately 6,000 troops with tanks, artillery, and attack helicopters in addition to 2,000 to 5,000 KGB border guards)²⁸ have effectively shot down the theory that the Soviets pose no amphibious threat to Japan.

Many Japanese regard Korea as the key to Japan's security. In this light, continuing political tension and uncertainty on the peninsula resulting from Park's

assassination and Chun's consolidation of power have contributed to Japanese security fears and have been instrumental in affecting changes in the public attitude toward defense. This is another factor encouraging a more favorable position toward the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty as are public statements by China encouraging Japan to increase defense spending.

4. Decision-Making and the Government

a. Method

Political decision-making in Japan is accomplished by three major bodies. The first is the Diet which has been firmly controlled since 1955 by the Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP). A large role is also played by the government's ministerial bureaucracy. In the bureaucracy, positions are filled by appointment. Because of the historical dominance of the LDP, the bureaucracy has been very stable and conservative and is sympathetic to LDP objectives. Some 70 percent of the bills submitted to the Diet are drafted by this bureaucracy and the great majority of these bills are passed.²⁹ The third element in the decision-making triad is the general public which, as the electorate, determines the party in power and sets broad limits within which the party and the government can function.

These three decision-making bodies are tied closely together by the ringisei system of business and bureaucracy which stresses consensual decision-making as opposed to the Western method of majority rule. The

Japanese use the term ringisei to describe the methodology of decision-making, or perhaps more accurately, the model for policy evolution.³⁰ In the ringisei model, a policy statement is drafted in the middle levels of the bureaucracy. This draft is then circulated within that level of the hierarchy where revisions are discussed until a consensus is reached. Then the document is forwarded to the next higher level in the bureaucracy where again a consensus must be reached. Only when the document has completed its intricate journey through this web to the highest administrators and has been approved, is the decision considered to have been made. Although some segments of modern Japanese society are beginning to tolerate the Western type of majority rule decision-making, the traditional consensual decision-making is the most widely used and accepted form.

Herman Kahn illustrates this system in his four step description for the passage of a controversial bill:

. . . .(1) the development of a recommended course of action among the conservative groups (usually some private consensus building among business, the relevant bureaucratic interests, and LDP leaders); (2) the explanation (or leaking) of the basis for this recommendation to the media, who present it to the public as a trial balloon; (3) the reaction of opposition groups, sometimes through the media, but increasingly through debate and negotiations in Diet committees; and finally, (4) the development of whatever compromises appear to be required under the circumstances.³¹

Because consensus decision-making dominates the political process, the floor of the Diet becomes little more than a formality with the real work and decisions coming

from the committee structure. These committees, whose composition normally represents the party distribution in the Diet, are often paralleled by corresponding committees in the LDP party structure. Again, one sees consensual decision-making as the Party committee formulates its policy on a given issue which is then brought to the Diet committee where the issues are discussed until a final compromise product is ready for presentation on the Diet floor.

b. Position

The official Japanese position on the overall scope of defense matters can be found in the Defense of Japan, the annual White Paper published by the Japanese Defense Agency. This document states that there has been no change in the basic premise of the national defense from the policies adopted by Cabinet approval in 1957. It asserts that the goal of the ongoing Defense Program Outline is, "To be capable of rebuffing cases of limited and small-scale aggression..." and also states that, "the primary mission of the Maritime Self-Defense Forces are (sic) to defend Japan against seaborne invasions and to secure sea lanes in the seas around Japan."³² The White Paper stresses the purely defensive nature of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces and strongly asserts that no personnel will be sent abroad for the purpose of any military action including the support of the United Nations.³³ This concept is not at all new. As far back as 1954 the House of Councillors passed

a resolution maintaining that the overseas deployment of the armed forces is unconstitutional.³⁴ In 1971, Defense Minister Nishimura stated, "In my view, the use of military means to protect overseas interests is not only anachronistic but useless...I can assure you that no Self-Defense Force unit or personnel will be sent overseas to protect Japan's economic interests by force."³⁵ Extreme tension in the Middle East in 1980 renewed dialogue on overseas deployment of forces. The Suzuki government took the stand that Japan could legally defend its merchant shipping on the high seas if required, but declined an invitation to participate in a multinational supervisory fleet for the northern Indian Ocean.

Concerning Japan's ability to protect its sea lanes, official statements have been consistently negative. In 1970, then Director General of Defense Nakasone stated that any guarding of sea lanes in the vicinity of the Malacca Straits would be completely outside of Japan's purview and out of the question for the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Forces.³⁶ Four years later, then Director General Maruyama explained that:

We have no such thoughts (of patrolling the Malacca Straits to protect Japanese shipping) because our maritime patrol limit is under 1,000 nautical miles. Arguments may arise that we would be able to protect all the ships coming to Japan from submarines--that of course is not possible.³⁷

The Japanese Defense Agency has normally avoided discussions of sea lane defense by the MSDF but has expressed serious

doubts that the MSDF can provide autonomous protection. A recent statement explained that the MSDF will share with the U.S. Navy the responsibility of anti-submarine warfare and convoy escort in the sea area. This area is generally acknowledged to consist of coastal waters extending 300 nautical miles (NM) into the Pacific Ocean, 200NM into the South China Sea, and 150NM into the Sea of Japan. In addition, the sea area includes two major sea lanes within 1000NM of Japan (to approximately 20 degrees North Latitude) and the sea area between them forming a rough triangle. The western sea lane extends from Osaka on a line toward Taiwan and then toward the Malacca Strait while the eastern lane runs from Tokyo through the Bonin Islands and toward Australia.³⁸

A process of slow and incremental change is evident in an examination of official statements. The general tone of each successive White Paper has placed increasing emphasis on the credibility of the Soviet threat. Bernard Gordon sees the departure from the traditional five-year Defense Build-Up Plans, which were based on building toward preannounced goals, in favor of the open-ended National Defense Program Outline, as a possible signal of upcoming policy changes.³⁹ Prime Minister Suzuki's announced goal of attaining the Program Outline goals by the end of fiscal 1987 invites speculation on a follow-up program even though the Prime Minister has indicated he has no intention of revising the 1976 Outline.⁴⁰

Sadao Seno and James Auer point out that while the civilian planners of the Defense Agency have been "...oriented strictly to protect the nation against invading enemy ships..." the uniformed leadership of the MSDF believes that they must "...ensure Japan's free use of the seas."⁴¹ Osamu Kaihara claims that the MSDF has already "...established the maintenance of the sea communications routes as its most important and basic duty, instead of the defense of the four main islands."⁴² An underlying theme expressed by many writers is that of government indecision or nonpolicy concerning defense. The basic feeling is that the government, while becoming increasingly concerned with the threat, has not made any decision as to what type or how much military it wants and is not willing to close off any option. James Auer best summarizes this school of thought in saying:

The Government has remained content to allow civilian defense planners to put forth their view on a limited, effective anti-invasion security force; but it has also allowed the MSDF leadership, supported by conservative politicians and business elements, to build some long leadtime naval vessels which could be used for a future oceangoing navy able to protect Japan's interests in local and more distant waters.⁴³

It seems that the members of the military establishments in almost every country would like to see their nation and more specifically their own branch of service increase its power and importance. However, because the National Defense Agency is structured to allow total civilian control, it is unlikely that military opinions will

have much weight in government decision-making. The 1978 firing of General Kirisu and the 1981 firing of General Takeda for making public statements challenging civilian control bear this out. John Emmerson explained that the military is buffered by bureaucracy and "...neither the opposition nor the LDP has any interest in increasing the political voice of the military in Japan. As a consequence issues will be made without significant influence from the uniformed leaders of the SDF."⁴⁴

5. Liberal-Democratic Party

The Liberal-Democratic Party has held power since its formation in 1955. During the period from 1976 to 1979 it was unable to maintain a clear majority of Diet seats, but a landslide victory in the 1980 elections following the death of Prime Minister Ohira clearly reestablished LDP dominance giving them 284 of the 511 seats in the Lower House. Despite this apparent superiority, numerous factions within the LDP, each with its own leadership and following, diffuses the party's political power. The ideological views of the various factions range from ultraconservative to liberal, although they are predominately middle-line conservative. Views on defense issues range from right-wing support for a massive and rapid defense build-up to left-wing support for continuing but slower growth. In general, the LDP favors a continued and gradual expansion of military power but it does not feel compelled to set eventual limits at this time.

The internal structure of the LDP is well organized for policy development. Two party committees, the National Defense Division (NDD) and the Investigation Commission on National Security (ICNS) are responsible for defense policy development. The NDD, concerned primarily with budgetary and technical policies, works closely with the Defense Agency while the ICNS has jurisdiction over the international, economic, social and political implications of national security policy. A policy recommendation from either of these committees would be forwarded to the Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC) and then to the Executive Council of the LDP before receiving the party's seal of approval. Here, as in Diet committees, compromise and consensus among factions plays a substantial role in shaping the final product.⁴⁵

The influence of business interests on LDP policy making is substantial. In the field of arms production and sales however, opposing segments within the business community have essentially nullified business influence. Defense contractors lobby for a stronger defense and for the liberalization of export restrictions on arms. On the other hand, there is countering pressure to maintain a very low defense profile for fear of antagonizing trade partners with an allusion to the militarism of World War II.

6. Opposition Parties

Opposition parties, taken as individual power structures, lack the strength to make a significant impact on decision-making and policy development. Following the 1980 elections the distribution of the 511 Diet seats in the Lower House was as follows: LDP-284; Japan Socialist (JSP)-107; Komeito (Clean Government Party)-33; Democratic Socialist Party (DSP)-32; Japan Communist Party (JCP)-29; and the New Liberal Club (NLC)-12. Although the opposition parties lack individual strength, they play a significant role in Japanese politics by posing an effective check to the LDP by forming coalitions, encouraging public demonstrations and support on specific issues, and in mounting mass media campaigns. They also play an important role in debate and in compromise negotiations on the Diet floor and in the committees.

The largest opposition party, the JSP, officially opposes the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty (MST) and favors its abrogation while hoping to establish increased solidarity with the non-aligned nations. They also want to reduce and eventually dismantle the SDF but will "take public opinion into consideration."⁴⁶ This qualification leaves the door open for a future policy change in the event the JSP should gain power and realize the necessity of maintaining the SDF. In fact, a 1977 poll commissioned by the Prime Minister's Office revealed that 78 percent of the JSP supporters (not necessarily party members) polled favored maintaining the SDF.⁴⁷ Furthermore, the chairman of the JSP

announced that if the LDP failed to get a majority in the 1980 election his party would be agreeable to forming a coalition government that would support the MST and the SDF.⁴⁸

The Komeito was formed in 1964 as the political party of the Buddhist sect, Sokagakkai. In 1970 it formally severed its religious ties but has remained linked to Soka-gakkai in the public perception. In 1978, the Komeito shifted its stand and publically supported the SDF but would limit its responsibilities to "defensive defense" (as opposed to "offensive defense"). The most recent policy change has been a reversal in its stand to abolish the Japan-U.S. Mutual Security Treaty. The May 1981 shift will admit the constitutionality of the SDF and the MST in a move that party chairman Yoshikatsu Takeiri said was "only natural to take a realistic stand of agreeing to the continued existence of the security treaty and the maintenance of the Self-Defense forces."⁴⁹

The DSP was formed in 1960 as a conservative splinter faction of the JSP. They have consistently supported the MST and favor a strong and totally self-reliant SDF with popular consent and under the principle of civilian control.

The JCP recognizes Japan's right to self-defense but seeks security through denunciation of the MST and a policy of unarmed neutrality. The JCP opposes hegemonism of any power and favors the dissolution of all military alliances including NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

The NLC splintered from the LDP in 1976 as a reaction to scandals and corruption rather than as an ideological movement. Because of this origin, its stand on defense issues barely differs from the LDP.⁵⁰

7. Business and Industry

Volumes have been written on the relationship of big business to Japanese politics and government, but Edwin O. Reischauer summed it up in one paragraph.

The Japanese have often described the symbiotic relationship between politicians, bureaucrats, and business leaders in terms of Janken, the paper-scissors-stone game of Japanese children. The conservative politicians depend on the money of business; business depends on the administrative rulings of the bureaucracy; and the bureaucracy depends on the political decisions and Diet votes of the politicians.⁵¹

These three groups closely interact for even routine matters and policy decisions are never made without prior consultation. There are several reasons for this cohesiveness. Many individual members have strong family ties through marriage and adoption to elites in other groups. Moreover, a great majority of the ruling elite are graduates of the University of Tokyo. These ties may be likened to, but are many magnitudes greater, than those found among the "Eastern establishment" in the United States.

Japan has placed considerable emphasis on the domestic production of defense material. In 1969 Japan was making 97 percent of its own ammunition and 84 percent of its aircraft, tanks, guns, and ships.⁵² In 1977, of a total of 458.3 billion yen in awarded defense contracts, only 22.2

billion were for imported goods.⁵³ With a defense budget of 2,446.6 billion yen for 1981 it is not unreasonable to expect 900 billion yen in defense contracts to be awarded to domestic firms. It must be noted however, that for the majority of the weapons-producing industries, defense contracts represent only a small percentage of their total output, with the largest producers in terms of total weapons contracts, tending to be less dependent on defense contracts. The top six arms producers are shown in the table on page 68.

Formally representing the business community in the political sphere are four principle organizations. By far the strongest and most influential is the Federation of Economic Organizations or Keidanren. Membership is limited to big business and large government corporations. Founded in 1946, Keidanren represents over 800 of the nation's largest corporations. Representing the small and medium-sized industries is Nissho, the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Nissho promotes the general well-being of Japanese industry. The Japan Committee for Economic Development (Keizai Doyukai) was founded in 1946 by a group of young executives who were dedicated to rebuilding a shattered Japan. This group has maintained a low profile in defense issues but is committed to a progressive economy and revitalized capitalism. The Nikkeiren (Japan Federation of Employers' Association) was originally founded to counter the militancy of organized labor. This stand has softened

TABLE 3-2: TOP SIX ARMS PRODUCERS

Firm/Zaibatsu	Total Contracts (billions of yen)			Main Products
	FY 76	FY 77	FY 78	
1. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries/Mitsubishi	98.1	97.4	153.0	tanks, artillery, ships, helicopters
2. Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industry	58.0	36.4	53.8	major shipbuilder (DDH, DE)
3. Mitsubishi Electric/Mitsubishi	20.0	34.9	52.3	light aircraft, missiles
4. Kawasaki Heavy Industries/DKB	25.2	39.6	40.3	P-2J, P-3C, anti-ship missiles
5. Toshiba Corporation	----	----	17.4	electronics
6. Hitachi Shipbuilding and Engineering/Sanwa	10.3	----	14.6	destroyers, submarines, AOE

considerably and the Association now works to promote harmony and the best interests of both labor and management.⁵⁵

Within the Keidanren organization, the Defense Production Committee (DPC) is tasked with promoting the aggregate interests of the defense industries. The DPC, although funded by the Japanese Munitions Industry Association, has widespread support among business leaders. In fact, in 1972 the President and six of the seven Vice Presidents of Keidanren were members of the Executive Council of the DPC.⁵⁶

The business community is, overall, in favor of a stronger defense. The head of Nikkeiren, Takeshi Sakurada, commented, "Japan should produce more defense arms for itself ...and spend every penny it can on defense."⁵⁷ The DPC has asked the government to double spending on defense-oriented research and development and Nissho has announced that it is working with Keidanren to relax the ban on arms exports, specifically on warships for export trade.⁵⁸

The charge is often heard that the DPC and Keidanren are at the heart of a powerful military-industrial complex. In fact, although the DPC does lobby extensively for the defense industry, its influence on policy and programs remains modest. Defense production accounts for such a small percentage of the major corporations' total output that at best, only marginal returns on defense are realized. While the benefits of research and development, technological

spillover, and the prospect of future contracts is not to be denied, it is not likely that the business community will provide the impetus for a greatly stepped-up defense effort. The majority of Japan's businessmen remain very reluctant to spend more on defense.

8. Mass Media

The mass media, especially the newspapers, reach a great number of people and are extremely influential in the political process. The Japanese are very well read as evidenced by the UN Statistical Yearbook 1970 report that showed 503 copies of daily newspaper circulation per 1,000 population. This ranked second in the world being surpassed only by Sweden with 528. By comparison the United States registered 305 copies per 1,000 population.⁵⁹ The three major daily newspapers (Asahi, Mainichi, and Yomiuri) each employ huge staffs who are permanently assigned to covering prominent politicians, government offices and business groups. These reporters normally constitute a formal press club which is assigned office space in government buildings, have daily press interviews and on occasion informal evening meetings at restaurants or in the officials' homes. The intimacy and camaraderie established by the press clubs provide avenues by which the officials can present their views to the public and at the same time receive public opinion pressure. This same system however, inhibits hardline investigative reporting which has played a significant role

in American politics. However this style of reporting is on the upswing in Japan in recent years.⁶⁰

C. FOREIGN POLICY

1. General

Donald Hellmann commented, "Japanese foreign policy is like a bamboo thicket: full and attractive in appearance, resilient in all kinds of weather, but lacking in real substance and crowding out all around it that are reached by its roots."⁶¹ The primary concerns of Japan's foreign policy have been: the preservation of her security through a close relationship with the United States; a policy of avoiding controversy in international affairs; and a single-minded goal to establish economic parity with the West. Other important issues to Japan's foreign policy are her access to oil and raw materials and the development of export markets for her manufactured goods.

As Japan has expanded her economic intercourse in Asia, trade and investment have also brought resentment. The popular image of Japan is becoming that of an "economic animal intent on pursuing her economic interest exclusively at the expense of those economically underdeveloped countries."⁶² The "ugly American" is becoming the "ugly Japanese." The importation of Japanese capital and technology is viewed by many countries as contributing to domestic economic instability, decline of locally owned industry, and widening income disparities.

These trade requirements and her economic power are forcing Japan out of anonymity and into the spotlight of international politics. Never before has a nation achieved such a level of economic power without corresponding military and political power. Having reached their main goal of economic development, Japan is at a crossroad with no map. As Herman Kahn put it, "Thus, with no new model to follow and no available design of its own, the country is drifting, not only economically but socially, politically, and culturally as well."⁶³ Resource procurement, the Soviet threat and changing attitudes toward the U.S. security stance seem to be waking Japan up to the necessity to assess her situation and choose a path. Minister of Foreign Affairs Okita summed up this view in a speech at the Foreign Correspondents Club on January 23, 1980:

As such, Japanese foreign policy is currently undergoing an important evolution. Very briefly, we are moving into a new phase of heightening awareness of Japan within the international political context and increasing willingness to act in accordance with that awareness. Some foreign observers have in the past characterized Japan as an economic giant and a political dwarf. Japan in the future should gradually narrow this disparity between our economic and political international involvements.⁶⁴

2. United States

From the Occupation to 1960, Japan was totally dependent on the United States for her national security and defense. Coinciding with the first revision of the Mutual Security Treaty in 1960, a buildup in the Ground Self-Defense Forces was the main political leverage employed in bargaining for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Japan. From

this beginning, Japan began to slowly develop her self-defense capability while remaining under the overall protection of the U.S. and the U.S. "strategic umbrella." The wording of the Mutual Security Treaty stresses defending Japan "against any armed attack" and plays a significant role in Japanese defense strategy. The Mutual Security Treaty does not obligate any Japanese response in the event of an attack on the U.S. but neither does it provide for U.S. protection for any contingency short of direct assault on the Japanese home islands. The cost of this security umbrella was the basing and transit rights for U.S. ships and aircraft in Japanese territory and the use of those bases and port facilities.

American policy in Asia since the announcement of the Nixon Doctrine in July 1969, has shifted from U.S. domination to an expectation of self-reliance on the part of Asian nations and from a focus on Southeast Asia to China and the northeast. U.S. troop strength in Asia dropped from 640,000 to 140,000 in ten years and naval forces have been more than halved. The New Pacific Doctrine announced by President Ford in December 1975 emphasized peace and stability in Asia through a balance of power between the United States, the Soviet Union, China and Japan. This policy was continued by President Carter with the normalization of relations with China and with Japan's inclusion as the "northern anchor" of American defense strategy.⁶⁵ From preliminary indications, it would appear that President

Reagan will pursue the same basic policies emphasizing a buildup of overall U.S. military capability, continued pressure on Japan to assume a larger role in regional security, and further development of Sino-U.S. relations.

While there is no reason to suspect any major change in U.S.-Japanese relations in the short term, there are two contending schools of thought concerning long-term economic developments. The neo-Malthusian school⁶⁶ feels that as resources become scarcer and the struggle to control those resources becomes more intense, resource-poor Japan may become an albatross around the necks of her allies. The neo-Malthusians urge a gradual loosening of bilateral ties leading toward a final position of more economic and military independence. Conversely, the Post-Industrial school⁶⁷ contends that Japanese growth will continue and that Japan will quite possibly establish herself as a military as well as an economic superpower. Should this come about, Japan would become the key to power distribution in Asia and as such, the Post-Industrialists argue that the closest political and economic ties should be cultivated.

The defeat of the United States in Vietnam, increased U.S. naval commitments in the Indian Ocean which has drawn down the Pacific force levels, and the buildup of Soviet ground and naval forces in Asia have raised Japanese apprehensions concerning the U.S. commitment to the Mutual Security Treaty. There was widespread feeling both in Japan and in the United States that the U.S. had lost confidence

in itself as a world leader and as a military power. Public sentiment for military noninvolvement clashed with feelings of moral obligations as crises in Iran and Afghanistan developed. Former Prime Minister Ohira expressed a sympathetic understanding for the U.S. position:

The U.S. has for too long been getting only requests and demands and complaints from the rest of the world. The other nations never felt that America needed help or cooperation or warm compassion from the others. I don't think the United States can keep getting these complaints forever. It's not Santa Claus. It cannot just keep giving forever.⁶⁸

Relationships over the past several years have been characterized by American expectations of Japanese support in international politics and policies and in an increased Japanese role in regional defense responsibilities. Japanese attitudes have been characterized by a determination to maintain an independent and pragmatic policy founded entirely on Japanese national interests.

These differing attitudes have produced frequent clashes in the foreign policy field, and when coupled with domestic and trade issues, have produced a roller coaster effect in bilateral relations. The trade crisis of 1977 culminated a period of growing U.S. frustration with trade imbalance primarily due to rising oil prices. Japan declined to support U.S. proposed sanctions against Iran after the seizure of the embassy which further exacerbated the situation. Condemnation of the Soviet Union for the Afghan invasion and support for the Olympic boycott served to ease tensions temporarily, but trade questions, this time with

automobile quotas, again came into the picture. The most recent series of disputes involving the collision of a Japanese merchant ship and a U.S. ballistic missile submarine, statements by former Ambassador Edwin O. Reischauer concerning the presence of nuclear weapons aboard U.S. ships while in Japanese ports and territorial waters, and the use of the term "alliance" in a joint communique following Prime Minister Suzuki's talks with President Reagan, have put U.S.-Japanese relations on very thin ice and have seriously jeopardized the stability of Suzuki's regime on the domestic front.

The subjects of Japanese rearmament and providing for autonomous self-defense have long been major issues affecting Japan-U.S. relations. The initial push by the U.S. was the creation of a 75,000-man police force that would free U.S. manpower for utilization in the Korean War. Through the rest of the 1950s and 1960s, the pressure subsided significantly. With the announcement of the Nixon Doctrine in 1969, the U.S. embarked on a course to convince and pressure Japan into a significant increase in her military and self-defense capability, and a larger role in the regional security of northeast Asia.

Former Defense Secretary Schlesinger urged that Japanese defense spending be increased to two percent of the GNP. U.S. civilian and military authorities have urged improvement in the areas of antisubmarine warfare, air defense, and logistics support. Lacking however, has been any definitive guidance as to the levels of capability that are

expected and what specific functions should be emphasized.⁶⁹ In essence, the U.S. demands have simply been for increased defense expenditures and for the Japanese to assume a larger share of their self-defense.

Japanese responses to date have included gradual increases in defense spending which tripled between 1962 and 1971, and again tripled between 1971 and 1978 in spite of remaining at less than one percent of the GNP.⁷⁰ A gradual building program has been in effect but recent emphasis has been on equipment modernization rather than further procurement. Prime Minister Suzuki has announced that Japan will meet the objectives stated in the 1976 Defense Program outline by fiscal 1987.

Suggestions from the U.S. have included Japanese participation in a joint "Pacific Patrol Fleet," that Japan construct two aircraft carriers and lease them to the U.S., and that Japan increase her ASW capability sufficiently to be capable of blockading the major straits through the Japanese islands and escorting convoys in the vicinity of Japan.⁷¹ Most recently Defense Secretary Weinberger repeated a U.S. plea that Japan increase her defense budget.

The whole issue of defense spending seems to stem from differences in the philosophical approaches to defense and security that are operative in the U.S. and Japan. In the United States, the solution to the security of the Pacific is seen in terms of the ability to marshal sufficient military strength to neutralize any threat. Consequently,

rhetoric originating in the United States emphasizes defense and military capability. The Japanese take a much broader view of Asian security. Their philosophy contends that economic strength and political goodwill are just as important as military strength and all must be considered in total when formulating a security policy. In their rhetoric, the Japanese bring this point home by consistently considering defense as one of the elements of the wider concept of security.

The Comprehensive Security Policy, as developed by the Comprehensive National Security Council, an advisory group to the Prime Minister, further emphasizes this attitude. The CSP calls for an outlay of up to five percent of the GNP for security. Included in that package are funds for foreign aid, resource development, cultural exchange, and economic development. Expenditures for defense, as included in the CSP, would remain at less than one percent of GNP.

In an effort to improve cooperation and understanding on military issues between the U.S. and Japan, the Japanese government, in late 1978, adopted the Guidelines of Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation which established the Japan-U.S. Subcommittee on Security Cooperation. The Guidelines cover three basic areas: (1) posture for deterring aggression, (2) responses to an armed attack against Japan, and (3) cooperation in situations outside of Japan that would seriously impact the security of Japan.⁷² Within the purview of the Guidelines and for the first time in the history of the Mutual Security Treaty, drafts of joint operation plans

are being written, procedures for cooperation in intelligence and logistics support activities, and standard defense measures are being devised. In addition, a joint command center is being planned which will allow direct and continuous coordination between the U.S. and Japan in time of emergency and will also be useful for joint exercises and training.⁷³

3. Soviet Union

The 1980 Defense White Paper spells out the Soviet threat to Japanese security in terms that leave no doubt that the USSR is the number one concern of Japanese forces. Japan's contemporary distrust and dislike of the Soviet Union began with Moscow's abrogation of the 1941 Russo-Japanese Neutrality Pact in the closing days of World War II. This dispute has been fueled by unfriendly and non-cooperative acts by both parties on a continuing basis.

Issues involving fishing rights have been at the heart of the most bitter disputes between Japan and the Soviet Union dating back to the 1930s when the Soviets accused Japanese fishermen of sabotage and espionage activities.⁷⁴ Following World War II, primarily as a matter of military security, Japanese fishing rights were totally restricted to coastal areas. Although the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 provided for the opening of the Sea of Okhotsk, the Bering Sea, and coastal areas near the Kurile Islands to Japanese fishermen, the Soviet Union did not sign the Treaty. Negotiations dragged on for over four years

finally culminating in a fishing agreement in 1956. The next two decades were highlighted by frequent accusations of violations on both sides. Disputes resulted from specific limitations and interpretations of the agreement and by the Soviet seizure of Japanese fishing boats for alleged agreement violations. In June 1975, a new agreement was signed primarily aimed at resolving disputes involving Soviet vessels off the coast of Japan. During the next two years the controversy centered around the Soviet seizure of Japanese ships. From 1975 through the end of August 1976, 1,553 vessels were seized along with 12,858 crewmen.⁷⁵ The widespread adoption of the 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ), established by the Law of the Sea Conference, made it imperative that Japan pursue a new fishing agreement with the Soviet Union in order to maintain her fishing industry. On May 27, 1977, the Soviet-Japanese Fisheries Agreement was signed. The Agreement requires the licensing of Japanese vessels operating in Soviet waters, imposes strict quotas on the catch, and provides for the inspection and seizure, if warranted, of Japanese vessels. The hard line taken by the Soviets in negotiations leading to the agreement is widely resented in Japan but is tolerated in deference to the necessity of obtaining the provided fishing rights.

The Northern Territories issue centers on the islands of Etorofu, Shikotan, Habomai, and Kunashiri, off the northeastern tip of Hokkaido.⁷⁶ The Soviet Union occupied the

islands at the end of World War II and recently increased its troop strength to just under one division and is upgrading harbor facilities and airfields on the islands. The Soviet claim to the islands stems from wartime agreements among the Allies on territorial division and on the San Francisco Treaty of 1951 in which Japan renounced any claim to the Kurile Islands. Japan contends that Shikotan and Habomai are offshore islands of Hokkaido and not geologically a part of the Kuriles. Furthermore, Etorofu and Kunashiri are not included in previous treaties concerning the Kuriles such as the Shimoda Treaty of 1855 which specified that the dividing line fell north of Etorofu (the northernmost disputed island), nor were they included in the Treaty of St. Petersburg in 1875 in which the Kurile Islands were ceded to Japan and were listed by name. All islands lying north of Etorofu and Kunashiri were listed by name indicating no previous Soviet claim regarding the islands south of that boundary line.

In 1960, the Northern Territories were held out as a political carrot to Japan in an effort by the Soviets to entice Japan away from signing the Mutual Security Treaty with the United States. Similar hints have been forwarded in various negotiations since that time, but with the establishment of more permanent military facilities in the islands, it would appear that the Soviets now intend to occupy the islands for some time to come.

Soviet intervention in Afghanistan evoked widespread Japanese condemnation and has been cited as one of the

factors responsible for Japan's trend toward a stronger defense posture. The disclosure of the 1980 spy case involving Japanese military officers and Soviet embassy officials also had an abrasive effect on relations as did the 1981 transit through Japanese territorial waters of a crippled Soviet nuclear submarine without prior permission from Japanese authorities.

Soviet protest has been provoked by Japan's handling of the Soviet MIG-25 pilot's defection in 1976 when return of the aircraft was delayed until after U.S. and Japanese experts could make detailed studies of the aircraft. Japanese positions in international relations, specifically the signing of the 1978 agreement with China, continued close ties to the United States and the reliance on the Mutual Security Treaty have been detrimental to any improvement in Soviet-Japanese relations.

On the other hand, before the escalation in tension in the early 1970s, very promising trade negotiations were beginning to unfold. The Soviet desire for Japanese capital and technology in return for much-needed Siberian resources of iron ore, coal, lumber, and oil may still play a significant role in future relations. The Japanese have always taken a pragmatic course in economic matters and there remains a definite possibility that obstacles could be overcome to greatly increase trade with the Soviets. Ever since the 1973 oil shocks, Japan has been pursuing actions to widely diversify her sources of raw materials in an effort to

prevent a repetition of those events. Regardless of the close proximity and relatively low transportation costs of Soviet resources, there is no reason to believe, as some writers warn, that Japan would allow herself to get into a position of becoming dependent on the Soviet Union for resources.

In the strictly military sense, the Soviets view the Japanese military forces in much the same light that they evaluate NATO forces in Europe, that is, as a combined threat in support of U.S. forces. As such, the Soviet's view Japan's changing attitude toward defense and her agreements with the United States and with China as a unified threat to Soviet security.

4. People's Republic of China

The signing of the 1978 Treaty of Peace and Friendship dramatically changed the complexion of the Asian political balance and testified to Japan's newfound willingness to take an increased role in world and regional politics. In signing the treaty, Japan and China agreed to lay aside, at least temporarily, "minor" disagreements such as territorial claims to the Senkakus and differences in political ideology. China's primary interest in the entente is in recruiting a new partner to their united anti-Soviet American-Japanese-Chinese interrelationships.

Both nations stand to gain substantial trade benefits although recent outlooks are not nearly so optimistic as the initial predictions. After the initial opening of trade relations, which resulted in somewhat of a scramble for the

fabled "Chinese market," Beijing restricted its policy on foreign investments by cancelling agreements and rearranging its financial priorities. Consequently, Japanese investors are proceeding cautiously following their bitter experiences.

Japanese capital and technology will be employed in a number of projects including long-term loans, oil exploration, railway improvements and construction of a steel mill. Chinese oil exports to Japan were scheduled to reach 15 million tons annually by 1982, more than doubling the 1978 levels; however, production delays may reduce those forecasts. In addition, Japanese arms manufacturers, specifically Mitsubishi and Ishikawa-Harima Heavy Industries, are lobbying for a relaxation of arms export laws to allow them to go into production for Chinese markets.

As early as 1973, Chinese leaders have commented that Japan needs the "American nuclear umbrella" provided by the Mutual Security.⁷⁷ As China's relations with both the U.S. and Japan warmed, the Chinese have expressed increasingly stronger approval of Japan's military buildup and have publically endorsed the 1979 White Paper which for the first time named the Soviet Union as a direct threat to Japanese security.⁷⁸ The Chinese strongly support an increasing Japanese role in regional security (as long as the recognized mutual threat is the Soviet Union) and have publically urged Japan to increase her defense expenditures.

5. Korea

Korea has traditionally been the stepping stone for invasion between Japan and the mainland. A long history of strife and colonial dominance have created deep-seated resentment between the Korean and Japanese people. One Korean intellectual described the history of Korean perceptions of Japan as a series of four pictures. At the beginning of the century, a savage and unfeeling Japanese came to plunder. In the next frame, the criminal cowers before the American liberator. Then comes the unscrupulous nouveau riche seeking profit out of Korean suffering and war. In the final frame, the Japanese is arrogant and denies the Korean a right to fish for a living.⁷⁹ Public opinion polls show that similar attitudes are held by both peoples.⁸⁰ Diplomatic normalization in 1965 has contributed greatly to soothe past wounds and economic relations have blossomed, but there is still a glaring lag in cultural and social relations.

There are opposing views concerning the importance of Korean security to the defense posture of Japan. Many authors consider Korea to be a "dagger pointed at Japan's belly."⁸¹ They feel that the security of Japan and Korea are intertwined such that barring exceptional circumstances, the fall of one will lead to the fall of the other. An opposing view is held by Edwin O. Reischauer who stated:

A united Communist Korea, if it came about without the loss of American face and credibility, would be a relatively easy matter for the Japanese to adjust to. A broad sea border would still exist between them, and

Korea, and they are already used to having the majority of the neighboring peoples under Communist rule.⁸²

Regardless of outlook, a unified Communist Korea would open a new threat axis supplementing the Soviet threat in the Kuriles. While this may not be the determining factor of Japan's future, it would certainly have considerable impact on the Japanese attitude toward a strong military.

South Korea and Japan are closely linked by economic interdependence. South Korea is the second largest importer of Japanese goods and Japan has become Korea's primary source of foreign capital, accounting for two-thirds of her total overseas investments.⁸³

In spite of economic dependence and security relationships, South Korea remains ambivalent toward Japan's defense posture. She would like to see a strong Japan but only strong enough to assume a role of greater self-reliance and by so doing, free American assets that could be called on to defend Korea.

6. Southeast Asia and ASEAN

Southeast Asia and ASEAN are extremely important to Japan as sources of raw materials and by their geographic positions, guardians of the sea lanes through which their shipping must pass. The Philippines provide 43 percent of Japan's copper and 25 percent of her bauxite is mined in Indonesia.⁸⁴ Eighteen percent of Japan's oil is provided by Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei. Total trade figures clearly indicate that Japan is Southeast Asia's leading trading partner.⁸⁵

Prosperity is also becoming a dilemma. The main fears in Southeast Asia are Japanese dominance through economic power and the possibility that because Japan is so poor in resources, she will try to obtain them by military force. The memories of World War II occupation have not been erased and the current Japanese practice of economic interchange with limited cultural or social exchange has done nothing to change these perceptions. The general public has little contact with the Japanese except by seeing the Japanese businessmen and wealthy tourists, and by seeing Japanese products that they cannot afford to buy.⁸⁶

In this light, the Southeast Asian nations are extremely wary of any strengthening of Japanese military forces, notwithstanding Prime Minister Fukuda's stated policy that Japan will never become a military power, that Japan would work to deepen mutual understanding in Southeast Asia, and that Japan would contribute to the peace and prosperity of Southeast Asia as a whole.⁸⁷ The Southeast Asian countries feel that if there is to be cooperation and prosperity with Japan, Japan should be wary not to be seen as exporting industries that pollute the environment, exploiting cheap labor in developing countries, or using the Southeast Asian states as a dumping ground for excess consumer goods.⁸⁸

IV. INTERNATIONAL TRADE, THE KEY TO JAPAN'S STRENGTH

Japan is the world's largest importer of raw materials and is commonly acknowledged to have the third largest GNP. Even with a substantially reduced growth rate, Japan's economy will surpass the Soviet Union by 1985 and according to one respected analyst, has already become the second largest producer in the world.¹ As Japan faces the 1980s she is coming to the realization that her traditional style of anonymity is no longer possible and that she must take a larger role in world politics. Japan has become a superpower without the development of extensive military forces to ensure her security and has instead relied on the assurances of the Mutual Security Treaty with the United States and on a foreign policy of political noninvolvement. As the U.S. is becoming less willing and less able to utilize military solutions in regional confrontations, the Japanese are becoming ever more aware of the fragile nature of their economy and the vulnerability of the sea lanes of communication.

A. RESOURCE DEPENDENCE

As an industrial superpower, Japan's economy is tied to the free movement of material in and out of the country via ocean routes. In 1968, Japan imported over 500 million tons of goods, of which 200 million tons were oil. Over 80 percent

of her wheat and copper, and 95 percent of her cotton, wool, nickel, bauxite, iron ore, and 99.4 percent of her oil was imported.² Four broad traffic routes carried the bulk of this traffic (Figure 4-1). Oil was primarily carried across the Indian Ocean and through the Malacca Strait from the Middle East. Bauxite originating in Australia and Indonesia transited an eastern Asia route while minerals dominated the trans-Pacific route from the Americas.³ By 1977 imports had increased to 592.7 million tons which included over 300 million tons of oil.⁴

Food imports climbed from 15.5 million tons in 1972 to over 28 million tons in 1977.⁵ By 1980, 70 percent of the food consumed in Japan was imported.⁶ Japan's commercial fishing fleet, the largest in the world provided the bulk of the protein for public consumption. Grain imports alone, on the other hand, are expected to top 30 million tons by 1985.⁷

Japan is almost totally dependent on imports for the most basic of strategic materials and food. Figure 4-2 displays this dependence vividly leaving no doubt as to the importance of reliable ocean commerce. Nearly every critical metal, energy source, and food must be imported by Japan.

In addition, most of Japan's \$102 billion of exports in 1979 were carried by shipping that amounted to approximately 3,400 ship visits per month to Japan.⁸ During the Fourth Arab War, the reduction of only 8 percent of her total oil

imports served notice of the vulnerability "...not only to oil supplies but also to its national defense posture in general."⁹ The overwhelming statistics have led James Buck to state that "Japan is the single industrialized nation most vulnerable to disruption of international trade patterns and access to food, energy, raw material sources and markets."¹⁰ Jay Sorenson concluded,

Japan's Achilles heel is its extreme dependence as a highly industrialized, island nation on stable markets and dependable sources of raw materials. Japan is highly vulnerable to the kind of economic blackmail that the Arabs exerted during the 1973 Middle East War, and the Japanese are also very nervous about their shipping lanes.¹¹

B. JAPANESE RESPONSES

The responses taken by Japan to deal with resource scarcity and dependence fall into two broad categories: national and international actions. National measures involve a restructuring of the nation's economic philosophy toward a slower growth rate in which emphasis is being shifted from primary (production) industries to the tertiary (leisure and recreation) industries while maintaining steady growth in the secondary (investment) industries. A second tactic being used is a shift toward labor intensive, low energy industries of the type labeled by the Japanese as "thought intensive" or high technology industries. Both of these policies serve the same purpose of promoting the relative advantage of the nation by maximizing use of its indigenous factors of production while minimizing the requirements for natural resources and energy.

Other national measures being undertaken by Japan include the stockpiling of strategic and vital resources as a hedge against temporary restrictions, price fluctuations or sealane interdiction. In 1976 legislation was passed to establish, by 1980, a one-month government stockpile of grains, soybeans and sugar to supplement the existing private stocks averaging a one-month supply.¹² Private industry, with governmental support, has been increasing its stockpiles of critical metals and ores toward a common goal of a one-year supply. In 1978 the Japan Petroleum Development Corporation began to maintain a stockpile of 30 million kiloliters (30-day supply) of oil. In 1980, a plan for an additional 90-day stockpile for private industry was established to be achieved in 1981.¹³ Private stocks of liquified natural gas (LNG) amounted to a 10-day supply at the end of 1980. The government has proposed legislation to the Diet which would stockpile a 15-day supply by the end of 1981 (460,000 tons) and the volume would be increased gradually to 3 million tons by 1988.¹⁴ The main drawbacks to stockpiling are the requirements for a massive tie-up of capital resources that could be used more productively elsewhere, and the obvious limits to the amounts of goods that can be stockpiled in the face of a total disruption or embargo.

Other useful measures being instituted include strict conservation measures, the use of alternative products and substitutes, emphasis on efficiency of use, and recycling;

all of which are geared to minimize the basic import requirements. In the energy field, the use of LNG and nuclear power is being strongly promoted. As of July 1979, there were 19 reactors in operation producing 12.7 million KW. Nine additional plants were under construction and seven more are planned which is expected to boost the total production to 28 million KW by 1985. That output is estimated to provide 6.7 percent of the national usage in 1985.¹⁵ Long range administration goals call for output in 1990 to reach 51 million KW but MITI estimates go no higher than 43 million KW.¹⁶

A major effort to combat the rising prices of energy is being conducted through a system of differential pricing. Through the pricing mechanism, vital heavy industries, industries which still maintain a relative advantage, and low energy using industries are being encouraged to expand and maintain production levels through lower energy costs, tax credits and loans. Heavy industries that are big energy users and who are not competitive are being discouraged against any expansion. The brunt of this pricing differential is being absorbed by the non-vital (leisure and luxury) industries and by the private consumers through increased gasoline prices and utility costs.

On the international level, Japan has established a policy of maintaining cordial relationships with all countries and urging international peace and stability. Toward these ends, she has tried to avoid political controversy by

downplaying her alliances and her military power and by refusing to take sides in issues involving her main suppliers.

The Japanese government has taken an active role in encouraging and directing the nature of her foreign trade. The oil shocks of 1973 and 1978 have been described by economists as the most significant events in Japan since World War II. Japan was importing 70 percent of her oil from Iran when the change in government necessitated finding new sources.¹⁷ This event emphasized the requirement for Japan to diversify her sources to the extent as to not be dependent on any one country so that she will be buffered from any local disruption in supply. Saudi Arabia is now Japan's largest supplier with a 30 percent share while imports from Kuwait, UAE, Oman, Qatar, Malaysia, and Brunei have increased between 14 percent and 68 percent. Significantly, spot purchases climbed by 68 percent.¹⁸ In addition, significant progress has been made in increasing trade and oil development ventures with China and Mexico.

In structuring foreign trade, Japan, in her quest to diversify sources, has also attempted to make herself the most important customer of the individual suppliers. Ideally, four to five countries would each provide 20-25 percent of the total import requirements for a particular commodity. This would allow sufficient flexibility in the event that one of the sources is cut off. By the same measure of limiting the number of sources to four or five, an attempt is

made to have each supplier provide 50 percent or more of its exports to Japan, therefore, making it highly advantageous to the supplier to maintain uninterrupted commerce. As a side benefit, Japan is in a position to obtain better terms of trade by encouraging competition among the major suppliers. Supplementing this strategy is one of creating good terms of trade for Japanese consumer goods in the nations that are the major resource suppliers. By providing fair terms, Japan hopes to encourage interdependence and a growing demand for her products and therefore, a growing demand for foreign exchange.

Japan has also begun to reduce trade barriers to encourage the flow of goods and long term contracts have been sought in order to stabilize both the supply and price levels of raw materials.

Overseas development assistance and private investment in overseas projects have gone hand in hand with the program to diversify resource suppliers. Official Development Aid (ODA) reached \$2.2 billion in 1978, a 55 percent increase from 1977, while bilateral government loans increased by 73 percent. Asian nations accounted for 60.6 percent of the official development assistance followed by Africa, the Middle east and Latin America with 18.6 percent, 10.4 percent and 8.6 percent, respectively.¹⁹ Private investment overseas advanced by 77 percent over the same period. By area, Latin America headed the list with 37.4 percent (\$2.14 billion)

mainly on the strength of oil development projects in Mexico. Asia was second with 28.7 percent sparked by an Indonesian aluminum project.²⁰ It should be emphasized however, that even though Japan's assistance programs have shown large growth in recent years, the great majority of that growth has come in the form of direct investment and government loans as opposed to outright grants.

A final tool Japan has been using to protect its economy from resource scarcity has been manipulation of the foreign exchange market. By allowing the yen to appreciate in the world market, she has been able to somewhat damper domestic inflation and more importantly, to reduce the cost of imported raw materials and energy. The cost has been a slowing of export growth but demand has proven relatively inelastic in high technology goods.

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TABLE 4-1: PERCENT OF TOTAL IMPORTS OF SELECTED MATERIALS
CARRIED OVER DIFFERENT SEA ROUTES, 1968

Route Description	Crude Oil*	Iron Ore	Copper	Lead	Zinc	Bauxite
East Asia east of Malacca St. including Aus- tralian and Indonesian routes	13.1	25.9	—	20.0	12.4	96.3
Northern Indian Ocean and thru Malacca St.	85.2	17.4	41.6	0.4	—	0.4
Southern Indian Ocean (from W. Africa) and thru Malacca St.	1.7	8.8	—	—	—	0.4
Trans-Pacific from North and South America	0.3	32.4	19.8	34.1	33.6	2.3
*Data are for 1970.						

Source: World Energy Supplies, 1961-70, UN Statistical Papers.

TABLE 4-2: PERCENT OF STRATEGIC MATERIAL CONSUMPTION
IMPORTED (NET), 1975

Aluminum (ore and metal)	- 100	Manganese	- 88
Chromium	- 98	Nickel	- 100
Cobalt	- 98	Phosphates	- 100
Copper	- 90	Rubber	- 100
Energy	- 90*	Tin	- 97
Food	- 70*	Tungsten	- 100
Iron (ore and metal)	- 99	Zinc	- 55
Lead	- 73		

* Indicates 1980 data based on Far Eastern Economic Review
1980 Yearbook.

Source: International Economic Report of the President trans-
mitted to Congress January 1977, (Washington: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1977)

TABLE 4-3: INTERNATIONAL SEA-BORNE TRAFFIC ENTERING JAPAN

Year	Number of Ships	Average Ship Visits per Month	Net Tons (in thousands)
1973	39,389	3282	283,991
1974	39,915	3326	298,118
1975	37,909	3159	280,196
1976	39,465	3289	299,983
1977	40,202	3350	315,125
1978	40,761	3397	318,371
1979	40,699	3392	341,252

Source: Ministry of Transport

V. THREATS TO SEA-LANE SECURITY

When defense of the sea-lanes is contemplated by the military planners of a nation, one of the first questions that must be resolved is the capability of a potential enemy to effectively interdict those sea-lanes. Military hardware, logistics and geographic considerations must all be taken into account. A second aspect that must be considered hand-in-hand with military capability is the objectives of the potential enemy. In other words, is it in the best interests of the potential enemy to use all or a portion of his capability to disrupt sea communications or are other means available to accomplish the same goals? Once the planners have satisfactorily, in their own minds, evaluated the magnitude and probability of the threat, they must then weigh the options and tactics available to them to most effectively counter the threat and insure secure sea communications.

A. PERSPECTIVES ON SEA-LANE INTERDICTION

The primary areas of threat to Japanese sea-lanes are: (1) at the source of raw materials; (2) in the vital Malacca, Lombok, and Sunda Straits; and (3) along the approaches to Japan's industrial centers. The disruption of oil shipments during the 1973 Middle East crisis shocked Japan into action to protect her sources of raw materials and oil in particular.

Since that time she has engaged in an ambitious and quite successful project to diversify her resource suppliers. Through programs of economic development and technological aid she has widely expanded her trade relations with South America and Mexico, Southeast Asia, and Canada in addition to joint development projects in China.

The Japanese have neither the ability nor the desire to militarily guard the sea-lanes in the vicinity of the Malacca Strait. This position is widely acknowledged by both civilian and military spokesmen. The Japanese strive to maintain close diplomatic and economic relations with the nations controlling the straits. The Japanese also acknowledge that the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) alone cannot provide for convoy defense and antisubmarine warfare responsibility in the local sea area without the support of U.S. forces. In this "local sea area", which the MSDF defines as coastal waters within approximately 300 miles of Japan and out to 1,000 miles along the two major sea-lanes, through the Bonin Islands on the east and toward Taiwan on the west, the Japanese Defense Agency even expresses doubts regarding the U.S. Navy's ability to protect shipping. In the 1979 Defense White Paper it states:

Regarding the capability of the U.S. Seventh Fleet to maintain control of sea-lanes, while the Seventh Fleet has substantial capability for antisubmarine warfare for its own defense, judging from force quantity it does not have sufficient capability to protect merchant shipping in the Indian Ocean and western Pacific, and therefore will have difficulty in completely preventing the Soviet Union from interdicting sea-lanes.¹

Western analysts of the Soviet Navy generally agree that "interdiction of enemy sea-lanes" falls far down the scale of wartime mission priorities for the Soviet Navy. The strategic nuclear strike mission, which includes forces assigned to insure the survivability of the SSBN fleet, is clearly the number one priority. Destruction of enemy naval forces, encompassing antisubmarine actions against U.S. SSBNs and anticarrier measures, occupies a second but still vital mission. A study of Gorshkov's writing seems to bear out the relative position of the interdiction mission.² In 1967 he listed the disruption of the ocean lines of communications as one of the most important of the Fleet's missions. In more recent publications, interdiction has not even been listed among current naval missions. In The Sea Power of the State he indicates that because of the impact of nuclear weapons on naval tactics, strikes against ports and sources of supply would be much more effective than at-sea interdiction.

A second line of thought centers on the well-documented Soviet emphasis on the need for a balanced navy which was described by Gorshkov in Morskoy Sbornik in 1967,

By a well-balanced navy we mean a navy which in composition and armament is capable of carrying out missions assigned it not only in a nuclear war, but in a war which does not make use of nuclear weapons, and is also able to support state interests at sea in peacetime.³

With this emphasis on the ability of a navy to function in a conventional war, as compared to a shorter duration nuclear exchange, the antisea-lanes of communication (SLOC) role

becomes much more relevant. Donald Daniel cites a 1976 article in Morskoy Sbornik which indicates increased emphasis on the anti-SLOC mission.⁴ In addition, an analysis of OKEAN 75 also suggested increased Soviet emphasis on SLOC interdiction.⁵

Regardless of the priority assignment within the Soviet Navy to the interdiction mission, the growing size of the Soviet fleet, particularly in attack submarines, will relieve the Soviets of having to make an either/or decision. Their choice will not be "Can we conduct an interdiction campaign?" but rather "What amount of resources can we devote to interdiction?"

The assignment of even a few assets to an interdiction role may even provide added benefits from the Soviet point of view by tying down a significant number of Western ASW forces. This would support the primary Soviet mission area by preserving the security of the SSBN as a strategic reserve. Nitze estimates that the Soviets could assign no more than 20 Pacific-based submarines to an anti-SLOC role and as such evaluates the threat to the Pacific and Indian Ocean SLOCs as "significant but manageable."⁶ However, in a more geographically limited conflict, in which those 20 submarines were specifically aimed at the sea-lanes supplying Japan, the effect could be devastating.

B. SOVIET PACIFIC FLEET

The Soviet Pacific Fleet began a significant buildup program in 1960 which has continued unabated to the present. Table 5-1 examines the current Order of Battle.

The primary threat to Japanese shipping will come from submarines and land-based strike aircraft. During the early stages of a major conflict, the bulk of these forces will be occupied in countering U.S. submarines and carrier task forces. As the conflict protracts, the role for sea-lane interdiction would become ever more important.

Soviet surface units are probably not intended for an anti-SLOC role. If the Soviets withhold a significant number of their SSBN assets from the early stages of a conflict as expected, the surface fleet's primary mission will be to maintain safe operating sanctuaries free from U.S. attack submarines and ASW task groups. This rationale notwithstanding, should the surface forces be assigned a role of interdiction, their firepower of 363 surface-to-surface missile launchers and 214 large caliber guns, has the capability of significantly disrupting the flow of material to Japan.⁷

Air assets which could be used in the anti-SLOC role are centered around the 110 Badger and Blinder aircraft in the Pacific Fleet. It should also be realized that within the Soviet philosophy of a frontal strategy, additional aircraft of the Long Range Air Force (including 10 Backfire bombers) could be made available to augment naval units. The primary

TABLE 5-1: SOVIET PACIFIC FLEET COB (AS OF JUNE 1980)

<u>Submarines (110)</u>			<u>Surface Vessels (cont.)</u>		
Ballistic missile submarine (30)	Delta SSBN	10	Amphibious vessels (57)	Ivan Rogov LPD	1
	Yankee SSBN	11		Ropucha LST	10
	Hotel SSBN	3		Alligator LST	
	Golf SSB	6			
Cruise missile submarine (23)	Charlie SSGN	17		Polnochniy LCT	46
	Echo II SSGN		Other Landing		
	Juliet SSG	6	Patrol boats (166)	Nanuchka PGG	55
Whisky SSG	Osa PTG				
		Other missile boats			
Attack submarines (57)	Echo I SSN	13		Poti PCE	111
	November SSN		Other patrol boats		
	Victor SSN				
	Whisky SS	44	Mine Warfare Vessels (95)	Natya MSF	50
	Foxtrot SS			T-58 MSF	
Zulu/Bravo SS	T-43 MSF				
		Yurka MSF			
<u>Surface vessels (397)</u>					
ASW Acft Carrier(1)	Kiev CVSG	1		Other mine warfare cft	45
Cruisers (11)	Kara CG	2	<u>Aircraft (382)</u>		
	Kresta II CG	3			
	Kresta I CG	1			
	Kynda CG	2			
	Sverdlov CL	3			
Destroyers (27)	KrivakII/I DDG	7	Bombers	Badger	110
	Kanin DDG	3		Blinder	
	Kilden DDG	1	Fighters	Forger	12
	Kashin DDG	4			
	Kotlin DDG	2	Patrol/ASW aircraft	Bear F	120
				May	
				Mail	
	Kotlin DD	10		Hormone A	
	Skory DD			Haze A	
Escort Ships (40)	Riga FF	40	Tanker/Recon/ EW aircraft	Badger	80
	Grisha FFL			Bear D	
	Petya FFL			Utility aircraft Various	60

Source: Far Eastern Economic Review, Asia 1981 Yearbook

armament of Soviet strike aircraft are air-to-surface missiles capable of conventional or nuclear warheads. The unrefueled combat radius of Soviet aircraft would permit them to strike as far away as the Malacca Straits from bases within the Soviet homeland.

Soviet diesel-powered attack submarines are extremely quiet while submerged and are ideally suited for the anti-SLOC role in offshore waters. Their lack of speed can be nullified by operating closer to vital harbors and straits. Nuclear-powered attack submarines, also possessing torpedos as their main armament, are not as quiet as the diesel submarines and therefore are more susceptible to passive means of detection. Their superior speed however, allows them to operate in a much larger ocean area while maintaining the same capability for sea-lane interdiction. The 23 cruise missile submarines available to the Pacific Fleet are probably intended to be used in an anticarrier role. Although they would be an extremely capable platform in the anti-SLOC role, they are clearly more valuable and most cost effective in fulfilling their primary mission. The cruise missiles carried by these submarines are also available in both conventional and nuclear configurations.

C. SOVIET OPTIONS

The military strength of the Soviet Union allows her a great many options for accomplishing the defeat of Japan.

Limiting factors are the scope of the overall conflict and the Soviet view of Japan's ultimate role in the post-conflict world.

The interdiction of raw materials at their source has been stated as a preferred tactic in overall Soviet Strategy. The invasion of Afghanistan and Soviet activities in Yemen, Somolia, Ethiopia, and other Middle East countries have lent credence to this point of view. This tactic however, can only be used as part of a broad, long-range plan. The lack of selectivity in implementing the plan militarily, would preclude the isolation of a single target country such as Japan. Implementation would necessarily affect the vital national interests of a large number of nations who are dependent on the Middle East for their energy supplies.

An attempt to interdict Japanese sea-lanes by cutting the Malacca, Sunda and Lombok Straits would likewise pose a severe problem with identification and selectivity. Additional problems involved in rearming and resupplying the participating units, along with the extended flight times for strike aircraft, make this option one of the least desirable from the Soviet point of view. Albert Axelbank, when discussing the defense of the Malacca Strait, said that in a wartime situation "...the danger to Japan's industrial sinews would be of much closer proximity than the Malacca Strait."⁸

The interdiction of merchant shipping to Japan on the high seas could be accomplished using any number of combinations

of strike aircraft, submarines and surface forces. The Japanese do not have sufficient indigenous forces to prevent or to break this type of naval blockade. Although identification and targeting problems are greatly compounded by operating on the high seas, as opposed to a blockade in the coastal waters and harbors of Japan, the Soviet sea surveillance system could provide sufficient data for a successful campaign. Providing a low level of conflict could be maintained, an added benefit could be realized through the deterrent value of an announced blockade. A "quarantine effect", under the threat of being sunk, could have a significant impact on neutral flag shipping. The major drawback to this option is that it invites escalation, leading to war with the United States. While the U.S. is not obligated to protect Japanese shipping on the high seas, interdiction of the sea-lanes is clearly a serious threat to the Japanese economy and as such is highly prejudicial to U.S. security interests. The United States would almost certainly respond militarily to the interdiction of Japanese sea-lanes.

A much more efficient solution to the interdiction of Japanese shipping would be the destruction of the harbor facilities and cargo handling equipment. Soviet strike aircraft could accomplish this mission quickly and effectively. However, this action would undoubtedly lead to a military response by the United States under the Mutual Security Treaty of 1960. Article Five of that document obligates the

U.S. to "meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes" in the event of an armed attack on Japanese territory. An Agreed Minute of the Treaty calls for immediate consultations with Japan in case of an attack and states that the U.S. "intends to take the necessary measures for the defense of these islands..."

Should the destruction of Japanese harbor and port facilities be contemplated as part of a larger war effort, the fastest and most efficient method of eliminating Japan as a factor in the war would be a concentrated nuclear strike against the industrial center between Tokyo and Kobe. As of 1979, 51.4 percent of the Japanese population were packed into this 250 mile long coastal strip that comprises only 19 percent of Japan's land mass.⁹ The concentration of people and industry into this "Tokaido Megalopolis", a total lack of civil defense programs and virtually no warning period in the event of a sea-launched nuclear attack, ensures the total economic and political destruction of Japan.

While some Japanese have expressed concern that the Soviet buildup of forces on the Northern Islands poses a threat of invasion to the Japanese mainland, this course of action is the least likely and the most costly from the Soviet point of view. The amphibious lift capability of the Soviet Pacific Fleet is minimal at best. Even though a successful invasion could still be staged, it would be tedious and much less

efficient than other options. Makoto Momoi is straight forward in his assessment that

...no aggressor will resort to an open, large-scale armed attack on Japan so long as other means of coercion are available...Rather than launching a frontal assault, an adversary nation would be tempted to exploit some of Japan's inherent vulnerabilities...heavy reliance on sea-lines of communication...and susceptibility to "quarantine" or blockade.¹⁰

The only military threat that Japan can realistically mount against the Soviet Union is the closure of the straits around Japan thereby prohibiting the free movements of naval units to and from Vladivostok. In the event of a short-duration, high-intensity war, this would have little effect on Soviet strength as it is anticipated that the Soviets would have sufficient advance warning of the conflict to put their units to sea before the outbreak of hostility. In a protracted conventional war in which sea-lane interdiction became a factor, a war of attrition would be waged as Soviet surface and submarine units would be forced to transit minefields, ASW barriers, and face missile-armed combatants in coastal waters in order to return to their bases for rearming and resupply.

In the context of this scenario, the rationale behind the Soviet buildup of forces and facilities on the northern islands and on Sakhalin Island comes into focus. There are two divisions of Soviet troops on Sakhalin. Troop deployments to Kunashiri and Etorofu in the southern Kuriles began in May of 1978 and expanded to Shikotan in the summer of 1979. There are now 6,000 men on the Northern Islands equipped with tanks,

anti-aircraft missiles, artillery and attack helicopters. Three airfields have been constructed with runway lengths to 3,000 meters.¹¹ There are nine naval facilities providing anchorages and harbors including Hilokappu Bay where the Japanese secretly assembled their fleet prior to departing for the strike on Pearl Harbor. While the forces on Sakhalin and the Northern Islands are insufficient to mass a major attack, in the event of war they would be extremely valuable in seizing vital positions on the tip of Hokkaido to prevent the Japanese from closing that strait to Soviet use. Utilizing ground support aircraft from the Northern Islands bases and amphibious landing craft currently present on the islands, a successful landing could be mounted.

D. THIRD WORLD NAVIES

The decade of the 1970s brought a dramatic increase in the ability of Third World nations to disrupt or interdict maritime shipping. Spearheading this movement has been the numerical and qualitative growth of fast patrol boats (FPB) armed with anti-ship missiles. The affordability and lethality of this combination has proven to be very attractive to smaller countries who until now, have not been able to influence the operations of the big ship navies.

The anti-ship missiles have several characteristics that have made them appealing to countries seeking a limited sea denial capability. First, they are relatively cheap, with

prices starting at just a few thousand dollars. Even the more expensive models, at several hundred thousand dollars, are considerably cheaper than an aircraft or major ship with comparable firepower. Second, anti-ship missiles can be adapted to a wide variety of existing platforms from small patrol craft to major combatants. Third, anti-ship missiles are fairly simple to operate and reasonably reliable. Most models require only a minimum of support equipment and pre-launch preparation. Fourth, their capability to hit and damage ships is widely understood and accepted. The emphasis on this point is the psychological impact and the ability to influence a situation through the threat of force in a revival of classic gunboat diplomacy. Finally, suppliers are widespread and numerous. Ten countries are currently producing anti-ship missiles: Canada, China, France, Israel, Italy, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the USSR.¹² Only Sweden and China do not appear to be producing for the export market.

In addition to anti-ship missiles, many Third World countries now possess torpedo firing diesel-electric submarines. The diesel submarine has excellent range and when used in shallow coastal waters provides an excellent capability for sea-lane interdiction. Third World countries have been supplied with submarines through military aid and sales from the major power navies. In addition, West Germany and the Netherlands produce excellent submarines for export.

In order for a Third World country to interdict or disrupt sea communications, they must possess, in addition to a capable weapons system, a means for surveillance and reconnaissance. This is a critical item if an interdiction campaign is to be directed against one specific country. Third World nations commanding a geographical advantage of a strait, such as Indonesia, can fulfill this need with shore-based radars and small aircraft and boats, while nations such as the Philippines must rely heavily on long-range patrol aircraft.

Several scenarios could be developed which would threaten Japanese sea-lanes. A minor naval power flanking Japanese shipping routes on the high seas may take an overt hostile action to enforce its claims to territorial sea limits or to further its political aims. Two nations involved in a dispute over control of a vital strait may take action to close the strait to any country not supporting their claim. Moreover, nations may bow to Soviet pressure to interrupt or harass Japanese shipping in order to forward Soviet interests. Such actions could begin with the harassment of merchant ships, such as dangerous maneuvering by warships and low-level overflights by aircraft. If a claim to territorial seas is in question, the aggressor nation may resort to the boarding and searching of merchant vessels which could then escalate to seizure of the ships and their crew. The next level may involve the sinking of ships without warning, culminating in a total campaign of interdiction.

While unilateral actions such as those described above would certainly evoke worldwide condemnation and would risk retaliation by Japan or the United States, the threat is nonetheless real. As James Cable stated,

There are already more navies than there are rational governments. Some of these navies may only be intended to provide remunerative and respectable employment for the officer class, but many could actually be used and some probably will be, whether or not the results commend themselves to reasonable men.¹³

The most serious threat posed by Third World navies to Japanese sea-lanes would come in conjunction with a major conflict between the NATO powers and the Warsaw Pact nations. The ability to concentrate effective naval power in a limited sea area could cut a vital sea route in an area such as the Malacca Strait or the Arabian Sea. Milan Vego evaluates this threat

While in peacetime a Soviet client-state might behave with restraint for fear of Western reprisals, there would be no such inhibitions in a general conflict, particularly if the country's leadership perceived the Warsaw Pact as the winner in the conflict.¹⁴

In Northeast Asia, China, by far, possesses the greatest potential for sea-lane interdiction and even though current political relations seem to be on the upswing, the Japanese are well aware of the changing nature of international sentiments. (See Table 5-2) With 99 submarines and 20 missile-equipped major combatants, the Chinese could severely disrupt sea communications in the East China Sea and the South China Sea. They can project only limited force into the Philippine

TABLE 5-2: NAVAL ORDER OF BATTLE FOR NATIONS ADJACENT TO JAPANESE SEA-LANES.
 () indicates surface-to-surface missile equipped.

Country	Submarine SS/SSN	Destroyer DD	Frigate FF/PF	Corvette	FPB	Patrol Craft
NORTHEAST ASIA						
China	99	12(12)	17(8)	9	829(181)	621
S. Korea	—	10	7	6	14(9)	38
N. Korea	16	—	4	—	317(18)	25
Taiwan	2	22(4)	9	3	10(4)	
SOUTHEAST ASIA						
Indonesia	4	—	7	3(3)	8(4)	30
Singapore	—	—	—	—	12(6)	38
Malaysia	—	—	2	—	14(8)	30
Philippines	—	—	2	10	—	55
Brunei	—	—	—	—	3(3)	9
Vietnam	—	—	3	2	44(10)	101
SOUTH ASIA						
India	8	3(3)	29(2)	4(4)	16(16)	6
Pakistan	6	6	1	—	16	3
Sri Lanka	—	—	—	—	6	17
Bangladesh	—	—	2	—	—	4
MIDDLE EAST						
Iran	—	3(3)	4(4)	4	9(9)	7
UAR	—	—	—	—	6	9
Oman	—	—	—	3	—	10(2)
N. Yemen	—	—	—	—	3	5
S. Yemen	—	—	—	—	8(4)	6
Somalia	—	—	—	—	9(2)	5
Bahrain	—	—	—	—	4(2)	14
Kuwait	—	—	—	—	—	43
Qatar	—	—	—	—	—	6

Source: The Military Balance

Sea due to the fuel and logistics limitations. Japan could minimize the effect of unilateral Chinese action against her sea-lanes by moving the routes further seaward. North Korea, although much closer to the junction of the Japanese sea-lanes, would also face a logistics problem. In order to put its naval units into position to attack, they must transit around South Korea and the southern tip of Kyushu. It is difficult to imagine a scenario in which North Korea would take unilateral action against Japan because of superpower interest. Likewise, it is difficult to envision a scenario for general war involving the U.S. and USSR, in which the bulk of North Korean forces would not be dedicated to opposing South Korea. Taiwan and South Korea, in addition to enjoying political rapproachment with Japan, have insufficient forces to effectively threaten Pacific sea-lanes although both countries are engaged in naval acquisition programs which include Harpoon surface-to-surface missiles.

Indonesian control of the vital Lombok and Sunda Straits makes her the greatest potential threat in Southeast Asia. Even though her naval forces number only 4 submarines and 7 missile-capable surface units, the geographic advantage she holds enhances the capabilities of even the oldest and most obsolete units. The naval forces of Singapore and Malaysia are centered around their FPBs, both missile and torpedo equipped. Both countries have been engaged in procurement programs for missile-equipped patrol craft and this trend

should continue. The legal implications raised by the Law of the Sea Conferences regarding the question of free passage through the Malacca Strait has the potential for conflict based on overlapping claims by Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore. A local conflict could threaten the security of all transiting vessels regardless of nationality. Vietnam's naval forces lack the range and seaward mobility to seriously threaten Japanese shipping. Brunei and the Philippines do not possess forces capable of at-sea operations.

India's military power is vastly superior to any other South Asian country. With an aircraft carrier, 8 submarines, 3 new missile frigates, 4 missile corvettes and 16 fast attack missile boats, she can not only disrupt ocean trade on nearby sea routes but also has the capability to project her power into the Arabian Sea. India is also adding to her forces with the procurement of 7 new submarines and four additional corvettes.¹⁵ When improvements to the base at Port Blair in the Andaman Islands are completed, India will be in a geographic position to control the sea lanes through the Malacca Strait.¹⁶ The other South Asian and Middle East nations adjacent to major sea-lanes can only exert influence on those sea-lanes passing within their coastal waters. Their navies are generally made up of fast attack craft and patrol boats. Missile-equipped boats are being purchased on a widespread basis primarily from France and West Germany. While force levels remain low, the rapid proliferation of surface-to-surface

missiles and the political volatility of the area will greatly increase the future threat to Japanese shipping.

E. JAPANESE PERCEPTIONS OF THE THREAT

Japan has long snuggled into the security blanket of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Cooperation and Security Treaty of 1960. Beginning with the announcement of the Nixon Doctrine in July, 1969, which stated an American expectation that Asian nations take a larger responsibility for their own security, the Japanese have perceived that the blanket is being slowly unraveled. The demobilization of U.S. ground and naval forces following the withdrawal from Vietnam emphasized the Nixon Doctrine in terms of capability rather than just intentions. The 1973 oil crisis awakened the Japanese public to the vulnerability of their sea-lanes of communications and the total dependence of the Japanese economy on imported resources. The announcement of a plan to withdraw U.S. troops from South Korea drew widespread attention. As a reaction to the crisis in Iran, the U.S. changed its policy of maintaining a carrier task group in the North Pacific resulting in extensive coverage in the Japanese press. These factors contributed to a conviction of the Japanese public revealed by a recent Asahi Shimbun poll which indicated that only 22 percent believed that in an emergency, America would defend Japan in earnest.¹⁷

The buildup of Soviet forces in the Pacific began in earnest about 1960. The Pacific Fleet now totals 397 surface

vessels, 110 submarines and 382 aircraft.¹⁸ Included in these totals are ballistic missile submarines, a Kiev class aircraft carrier and the largest amphibious ship in the Soviet inventory. During OKEAN II in 1975, Soviet maneuvers in the Pacific included four squadrons deployed in the Sea of Okhotsk, in the Marianas Islands, in the vicinity of the Caroline Islands and in the East China Sea. Osamu Miyoshi postulated that

...the main military goals of the Soviet Fleet, in the event of a total Soviet and American war are: first to attack and demolish U.S. bases on the West Coast and in the Western Pacific Ocean; second, to cut off Japan from U.S. military operation in the Western Pacific; and third,¹⁹ to intercept or disrupt Japan's main oceanic trade routes.

The buildup of Soviet military strength on the Kurile Islands which began in 1978 is an extremely sensitive issue to the Japanese. Likewise, Japan's reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was very strong including economic sanctions, the suspension of Siberian development talks, and support of the Olympic boycott. Forty-two percent of the respondents in a 1981 poll indicated that they felt anxiety about other countries attacking Japan and of that group, 79 percent most feared the Soviet Union.²⁰ In March of 1980, six Soviet naval vessels and an icebreaker transited the Soya Strait and across the frozen Sea of Okhotsk. As the first demonstration of its kind near Japanese waters, it attracted a great deal of public attention.²¹ Extensive media coverage is also devoted to other Soviet warship transits of Japanese straits, reconnaissance flights near Japan and the ever more frequent missile firing exercises in the Sea of Okhotsk.

The Japanese are acutely aware of their total vulnerability to nuclear attack. The concentration of population and industry in the Tokyo-Osaka metropolitan areas, the absence of any anti-ballistic missile system, minimal conventional air defense capability and no civil defense program, all aggravate the effects of a nuclear strike.

Regarding the Japanese defense capability against an all-out conventional assault, the outlook is only slightly better. Without U.S. assistance, Osamu Kaihara estimated that

In the event the Soviet Union were to attack Japan tomorrow, Japan's air-defense system, in my judgement, would be wiped out in about 10 minutes, Japan's maritime fighting force would not last more than two or three days and Japan's ground force capabilities would come to an end in three or four days.²²

While granting that Kaihara represents one of the more pessimistic points of view, the attitude is widespread that Japan could not withstand an assault by the Soviet Union. In short, a large-scale invasion or a nuclear attack would most likely result in the destruction of Japan's only real assets, her people and her industrial complex.

With this in mind, James Morely assesses the most probable threat by commenting

The most likely potential military threat to Japan and its lifesupport systems would therefore seem to be the cutting off of supplies by the interdiction of its air and sea-lanes. Less likely, because it would probably be unnecessary, is a bombing attack or an invasion by ground assault forces.²³

The Japanese are very aware of the threats to their sea-lanes of communication. Recent indications of direct

threats to the sea routes include the introduction of Backfire bombers to the Kamchatka peninsula as part of the Long Range Air Force and evidence that the port at Najin, in the extreme northeast of North Korea is being developed as a potential Soviet warm-water base.²⁴ The Soviet use of Vietnamese facilities at Cam Ranh Bay and Danang as resupply and staging areas has also been of concern to the Japanese. The Japanese Defense Agency expressed concern that the USSR intends to

...use airfields, ports and harbors in Indochina on a permanent basis. This would have an impact on the military balance between the U.S. and the USSR. This would not only affect the peace and security of this region, and the security of sea lines of communication, but also impose restrictions on activities by Western nations in areas surrounding this region.²⁵

Regarding the potential threat from Third World nations, Japan has taken no overt military action to insure the security of her sea-lanes and has, in fact, adopted an attitude of benevolent neglect. Japan has been careful in her diplomatic dealings with the Third World to emphasize her lack of military capability and her disdain for the use of force in solving international disputes. Her efforts to insure sea-lane security have been completely restricted to economic and political actions. Using only the criteria of available naval power, the Japanese approach is logically sound. The Japanese navy does not have the logistic capability to sustain operations far from the homeland, a limitation highlighted by their own proclamation limiting their area of concern to 1000 NM along the major sea routes. Additionally, even if

Japanese units were in a geographic position to oppose Third World interdiction activities, their general lack of tactical air power, anti-air (anti-missile) warfare capability and surface-to-surface missiles would minimize their effectiveness against missile armed FPBs.

VI. SEA-LANE DEFENSE: A RATIONAL CHOICE?

A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The historical record speaks out strongly in favor of the use of convoys to protect merchant shipping against hostile attack. Merchant convoys saved the Allies' Atlantic lifeline in 1917 and again in 1942. In each instance independent sailing was attempted, leading only to unacceptable losses. With the implementation of convoy tactics, merchant losses declined significantly while submarine losses increased.

Between February 1917 and October 1918, British ships on the high seas suffered a 5.9 percent loss rate while sailing independently as compared to losses of 0.3 percent while in convoy. In the last eighteen months of World War I, only 257 of 84,000 merchant ships sailing in convoy were sunk and of these, only two were lost when escorted by both ships and aircraft.¹

In September 1939, Germany possessed 57 U-boats. By the end of November those submarines had sunk 89 Allied merchant ships totaling 340,275 tons.² The United States declined to use convoys early in the war. In the first four months of 1942, 1.2 million tons of shipping were sunk in American waters. Throughout 1942, German forces were sinking an average of 700,000 tons per month, a rate which Germany considered sufficient to win the war.³ The exchange rate of merchant

ships sunk to U-boats sunk was 12.8:1. In 1943, as the Allies began to emphasize convoy shipping, the exchange rate dropped to 2.6:1 and over the final twelve months of the war it dropped further, to 0.6:1.⁴

Convoy escorts accounted for 67 percent of the total German submarine losses with land-based aircraft and escort ships proving equally effective in numbers of kills.⁵ The loss rate for Allied shipping through the entire war for ships sailing in convoys was 0.7 percent. The loss rate for independent shipping was at least twice as high.⁶

B. MODERN STUDIES

Technological changes have eroded many of the benefits of the World War II convoy and at the same time have significantly changed many other factors in the equation for sea-lane security. Submerged endurance of modern submarines, both nuclear and diesel, coupled with increased speed greatly enhances their capabilities for sea-lane interdiction. On the other hand, significant developments in the fields of acoustic detection and sonar technology have, to some extent, offset submarine developments. Anti-ship cruise missiles, both air-launched and surface-launched, have added another dimension to the convoy defense problem just as the shipboard ASW helicopter has complicated life for the submariners. The speeds attainable by several classes of today's merchant ships also offer some degree of protection simply by reducing

exposure time to the potential threat. With merchants transiting at double the speed of their World War II counterparts, they force even the most modern submarines to run at high speeds which limits their detection capability and at the same time makes them more vulnerable to counterdetection because of their high generated noise levels.

In 1974, Project Sea Express was conducted in an attempt to verify these developments and to consider various shipping alternatives and ASW force configurations for merchant ship protection. One phase of the study examined the feasibility of creating a free shipping zone using ASW barriers and area search techniques which would allow merchants to transit independently in relative safety within the zone. Another alternative relied on the use of convoys with dedicated ASW escorts accompanying the transiting ships. The study concluded that no independent shipping method was as effective as convoying. Additionally, convoying with ASW escort units was not only more effective in protecting merchant shipping, but was also more effective than any area search method for destroying submarines.⁷

Once the basic theory of convoy shipping has been accepted, one is faced with the decision of how many convoys will be formed and of what size. During World War II, convoys averaged 45 ships departing U.S. ports daily. More modern planners think in terms of 60 ships sailing twice a week. It is estimated that due to the increased size (15,000 tons as compared

to 5,000 tons) and speed (15 knots as compared to 10 knots) of modern merchants, an equivalent amount of material could be delivered.⁸ Another alternative is pulsed shipping which involves infrequent steaming of very large convoys.

Both plans have advantages and drawbacks that cannot be overlooked. Small convoys sailing continuously will provide a continuous supply of targets for enemy attack. In the early stages of the conflict, before the enemy forces feel the affects of attrition, losses should be expected to be very heavy. On the other hand, assembly of the required ships, loading, warehouse capacity and command and control would be much easier in a small convoy. In addition, the most significant advantage in using small convoys is the time factor involved. Smaller amounts of critical materials delivered early on in the conflict could well have a greater impact on the outcome than massive amounts of material delivered too late.

A study of the pulsed shipping method showed that losses, in the long run, could be reduced by as much as 50 percent. There is however, a threshold convoy size below which pulsed shipping offers no particular advantage.⁹ The threshold pulse size ranges from 300 to 500 ships depending on the expected threat. As the size increases above the threshold, the effectiveness of pulsed shipping rapidly increases. Pulsed shipping theory calls for action to occur in two distinct phases. In the initial phase, material and ships are

assembled in safe locations while ASW forces carry out extensive area search campaigns against enemy submarines. This period could last 60 to 120 days depending on the strategic reserves and stockpiles in the recipient areas. The second phase consists of the loading, transit, and unloading of the cargo at its final destination. Both phases of pulsed shipping are designed to minimize the opportunities of exposure of the ships to enemy forces. The initial delay in shipping will minimize contact between the merchant ships and submarines, while at the same time provide an opportunity for friendly ASW forces to seek out and destroy at least some of the enemy submarines. Sailing the merchant ships in mass is designed to saturate the offensive capability of the submarines, thereby reducing the average exposure time for an individual ship.

While pulsed shipping appears attractive in respect to expected loss rates, there are several drawbacks. The time required to assemble a convoy of this magnitude may simply not be available due to limited stockpiles or pressing combat action by the enemy. Secondly, port dimensions and cargo handling capacity will not allow the simultaneous processing of 500 ships on either end of the convoy route. This would require loading ships in several ports and a transit to an at-sea rendezvous with the procedure being reversed at the destination, making ships vulnerable to attack at either end of the operation. A third drawback is the logistics nightmare in trying to coordinate port congestion, loading and

delivery, warehouse capacity, ship availability and command and control for an operation of this size.

Although the studies mentioned above were concerned with an Atlantic scenario and the resupply of NATO, the basic concepts retain some measure of validity when applied in the case of Japan. For example, her excellent port facilities, large merchant marine, and the stockpiling of strategic resources all serve to minimize some of the limitations inherent in the pulsed shipping plan.¹⁰

It is interesting to note that none of the studies evaluated the effects of a tactical nuclear strike on a convoy formation. A 500 ship convoy, with its vast quantities of strategic material, would be an inviting target and it would not be far-fetched to consider the shipment as a critical factor in the outcome of a conflict thereby making it imperative that the entire convoy be destroyed. With these factors in mind, we will now look at some of the specific proposals for defending Japanese sea-lanes.

C. SEKINO PLAN¹¹

The most outspoken advocate of sea-lane control and the convoy escort concept is Hideo Sekino. He admits that while protection of maritime traffic will be difficult, the task is not impossible. Sekino sees the Soviet submarine fleet as the most probable and most capable threat. Sekino also feels that a stable balance of nuclear deterrence exists

between the Soviet Union and the United States. In this context, mutual deterrence and Japan's relationship with the United States under the Mutual Security Treaty negates the threat of a Soviet nuclear strike.

The first task in "The Sekino Vision", as it is labeled by James Auer,¹² is to reduce shipping to about half of the normal peacetime levels and to limit the operating areas for the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) to the seas north of Indonesia, between Australia and Japan, and between the United States and Japan. These shipping lanes conform closely to those described in Chapter 4 (Table 4-1) as providing the bulk of Japan's strategic minerals. With the majority of her food imports continuing to be supplied by the United States, Japan would have to rely on the cooperation of the U.S., Australia and Indonesia to provide a sufficient amount of petroleum and coal to ensure her economic survival. Sekino estimates that 600 ship arrivals per month would ensure Japan's survival and that 96 destroyer-type ships will be required to provide adequate ASW defense.

At the same time, the four main straits in the Sea of Japan would be mined and patrolled thereby imposing a blockade between Soviet submarine bases and their access to the Pacific. The Tsugaru and Shimonoseki Straits (Figure 6-1) are totally within Japan's territorial waters and could easily be controlled with mines and coastal patrols. The Tsugaru Strait, separating Honshu and Hokkaido connects the Sea of Japan with the Pacific



FIGURE 6-1

Ocean. It is the northernmost strait through the Japanese islands which remains passable in winter. It is 38 miles long and narrows to 10.5 miles. It is shallow enough to permit bottom and moored mining; however, currents up to seven knots would complicate the mining problem. The Shimonoseki Strait, between Honshu and Kyushu, is very narrow and has treacherous currents. Submarine traffic from the Sea of Japan transiting the strait would then have to navigate the shallow and congested inland sea making its use highly undesirable for all but local traffic. The Tsushima Strait separates Kyushu from the southern coast of Korea. About 110 miles separate the two coasts but the channel is divided by the Japanese islands of Tsushima and Iki Shima. Both western and eastern channels provide 25 miles of water suitable for deep-draft vessels. Given the cooperation of the United States and South Korea, this strait could be controlled using mines and coastal patrols. Control of the Soya (LaPerouse) Strait between Hokkaido and Sakhalin would be extremely difficult if not impossible because of Soviet forces on the southern tip of Sakhalin. The strait, which is frozen in winter, is 23 miles wide and has a limiting depth of 90 feet. The Tartar Strait, the fifth exit from the Sea of Japan lies entirely within Soviet water, is shallow and icebound much of the year, and is not considered significant.

The second phase of Sekino's plan would establish what Sekino calls a "Maritime Safety Zone" which would encompass

the ocean area between two island chains extending southeast and southwest from Japan (Figure 6-2). The western chain follows a line from Kyushu down the Ryukyus to Okinawa to Taiwan, and the Philippines, ending in Borneo. The eastern chain extends from Tokyo Bay through the Izu Islands, the Nanpo Islands and the Bonin Islands, on to Iwo Jima and terminating in the Marianas. On some of the Japanese islands in the chains, fixed sonar stations would be established in addition to bases for ASW patrol planes and helicopters. All shipping would be routed through the zone in the form of convoys which could be escorted as required. Throughout the zone, ASW aircraft and surface units, acting on fixed sonar detections, would prosecute any submarines that managed to escape from the Sea of Japan. Patrol planes equipped with air-to-surface missiles would provide convoy protection against Soviet surface ships. To provide air defense in the zone, long-range air search radar and V/STOL (Vertical/Short Take-Off and Landing) fighter aircraft would be stationed on some of the larger islands in the chains. The Sekino plan is based on the principle of attrition. Assuming that a portion of the Soviet threat will be destroyed during each barrier passage to rearm and refuel, and assuming that the ASW forces will not suffer unacceptable losses themselves, then the longer the campaign continues, the more submarines will be lost and the more cargo will be delivered. Thus the longer the economy can survive despite sea-lane interdiction, the higher the probability for success.




FIGURE 6-2

Not all strategists agree that the Sekino plan is a viable method for the protection of the sea-lanes of communication. Harry Rosen says it will work only if stockpiles are built up, the straits of the Sea of Japan are mined, convoys are routed far to sea to maximize the time/distance problems for attacking submarines and that full use is made of U.S. forces as well as the MSDF.¹³

Undoubtedly the most vehement criticism of "The Sekino Vision" comes from Osamu Kaihara. According to Kaihara, such a role for the MSDF is "unauthorized, unrealistic, and impossible."¹⁴ The role is unauthorized because it is in violation of the defined types of aggression spelled out in the White Papers. It is unrealistic because ASW resources, sensors and platforms, are lacking in both quantity and quality. Kaihara stresses the very real problems involved in the detection and destruction of nuclear submarines even with the most advanced sonar and weapons systems. He also questions that 600 ship arrivals per month could be sustained even if the large number of escort ships required by the plan were available. Further, he believes that while ASW patrol aircraft would be indispensable in peacetime, their bases would be among the first targets during war thereby severely reducing the security of the "Maritime Safety Zone."¹⁵ Finally, Kaihara says the plan is impossible because the mining of the straits of the Sea of Japan will be construed as an offensive action by the Soviet Union and will lead to retaliation and full-scale war.

There are two other significant weaknesses in Sekino's plan. To date, the V/STOL fighter has not demonstrated sufficient range or reliability characteristics to provide adequate protection in the "Maritime Safety Zone." While range problems could be alleviated to some extent by routing convoys closer to the island chains, maintenance and logistics problems detract from the plan's viability. (It should be noted that Okinawa and Iwo Jima are the only Japanese islands in either chain which are large enough to accomodate conventional fighter aircraft.) Another option, although as yet undeveloped, would be the introduction of an aircraft carrier for V/STOL aircraft.

Although Sekino relies heavily on the mining of the Sea of Japan straits as a measure to deny Soviet submarines access to the sea, he has failed to consider the possibility of the Soviet use of mines to close Japanese ports and harbors. The Russians first used mines in the Crimean War and have continued to place emphasis on mine warfare as evidenced by their huge stockpile of mines and the largest fleet of minesweepers in the world. Even though the Japanese minesweeping force is the world's second largest, it is doubtful that the lessons of "Operation Starvation," would be overlooked by the Soviets.¹⁶

D. SHILLING PLAN¹⁷

David Shilling, a U.S. defense analyst, has proposed an updated version of the Sekino plan in which he modernizes

some of the operational concepts and perhaps more significantly, quantifies the import reductions required to successfully execute the plan. He estimates (based on 1973 data) that 1978 peacetime import tonnage could reach 800 million metric tons and ship arrivals would average about 2,150 per month. The actual import tonnage for 1977 came to 592.7 million metric tons;¹⁸ however, monthly ship visits were at 3,350 per month (Table 4-3). Although these figures detract from the statistical balance of his plan, the theoretical concepts remain valid. Shilling contends that imports could be reduced by 70 percent through a combination of postponing non-government investment and the suspension of production for export. This plan for "austere import requirements" would involve two key preconditions: sufficient foreign exchange reserves and/or prearranged credit agreements to allow continued purchase of critical imports, and the government's willingness to financially support workers displaced by the elimination of export production.

The second step in achieving this plan aims at reducing personal consumption through rationing, taxes and price controls. This, Shilling estimates, could reduce imports by an additional 35 percent. As a final measure, he recommends stockpiling of vital raw materials, specifically petroleum. Assuming an austere consumption rate due to the other measures described above, the 90-day stockpile of oil currently programmed, could be stretched to perhaps six months. Food

imports are not considered a problem because even though 70 percent of Japan's food is imported, it represents only about 5 percent by weight of the total imports.

Shilling summarizes that through this combination of economic measures and the shift to an austere level of imports, requirements could be reduced by 85 percent for five to six months, representing a reduction in shipping requirements to about 280 ship arrivals per month.

Militarily, Shilling would concentrate MSDF assets in the sea-lane closest to Japan for convoy escort duties. In order to maximize the use of the least vulnerable sea-lanes, priority would be placed on obtaining vital imports from Indonesia, Australia, Malaysia and the Philippines. Convoys would then be assembled in a central location such as the Celebes Sea and convoyed north to Japan. Convoys from the eastern Pacific are assumed to be escorted by U.S. ships to some handover point in the mid-Pacific where Japanese escorts would assume responsibility. Shilling's plan provides for 10 escorts per 60 ship convoy. Based on escort availability and transit time, he estimates that four to five convoys could arrive each month thereby meeting the projected "austere import requirements."

Other military measures include the mining of the straits of the Sea of Japan and an extensive ASW campaign by patrol aircraft based in Kyushu and Okinawa. Shilling also proposes a series of mine barriers between the Ryukyu Islands augmented

by sonobuoy fields to detect and destroy any submarines trying to penetrate the barrier.

As was mentioned earlier, Shilling's plan assumed peacetime ships arrivals at 2,150 per month in 1977 while the actual count came to 3,350. Actual import tonnage however was below his initial estimates indicating a leveling off in the trend toward larger capacity ships such as supertankers and bulk ore carriers. Using the same percentage reductions for an "austere import" program, and assuming 3,400 ship arrivals per month, 436 arrivals would be required to maintain economic survival. Due to a fixed number of escorts available, this would necessitate increasing the average convoy size to approximately 100 ships thereby increasing control and coordination problems and reducing the level of protection provided by the escorts.

Another weakness in Shilling's plan is in his reliance on massive and widespread sonobuoy and mine fields. The sea area involved in attempting to mine the gaps between the Ryukyu Islands makes that proposition nearly impossible. While Japan's mine inventory may be sufficient to close the major Sea of Japan straits, it is highly unlikely, even with a massive building program, for Japan to have sufficient quantities to close the island chain. Mine delivery would also be a problem considering Japan's total lack of bomber aircraft. ASW patrol aircraft are capable of minelaying but the magnitude of the task is beyond their capacity. This

would relegate minelaying to surface forces and submarines, an exceedingly slow method for the area to be covered. The extent of the sonobuoy fields proposed by Shilling is also beyond the capability of the MSDF. The requirement to provide on-station monitoring of the sonobuoys, periodic reseeding of the fields, and prosecution of detected submarines is well beyond the capability of the MSDF.

Similar to criticism of Sekino's plan, Shilling does not consider the implications of a Soviet mining program nor does he consider the vulnerability of the ASW aircraft bases to Soviet attack.

E. TAOKA PLAN¹⁹

A more futuristic plan is proposed by Shunji Taoka which calls for a force of 1,500 ASW helicopters to be stationed on the merchant ships themselves which he estimates could shelter one 50-ship convoy with one million tons of imports daily.

This idea of convoy self-protection is very similar to proposals in the U.S. such as ARAPAHO.²⁰ In these plans, hydrophone arrays for the passive acoustic detection of enemy submarines could be towed by some of the units in the convoy. Sophisticated processing equipment, power supplies, communications gear and maintenance equipment could be containerized for rapid and convenient installation and placed on the merchants. Likewise, maintenance equipment for the ASW helicopters,

living quarters for their crews and data processing equipment could also be containerized. A bolt-on steel flight deck to accommodate the helicopters would complete the transformation.

Personnel, availability equipment maintenance, and high initial and operating costs are the main drawbacks to the convoy self-protection plans. The numbers of highly trained personnel required to maintain and operate the helicopters and support equipment would simply not be available in the early stages of war. The existing reserves for the MSDF number only 600 men. This severe shortage of personnel also impacts heavily in the maintenance field. The hundreds of helicopters and thousands of containers of support equipment would need constant attention and routine operational checks to insure their reliability in the event of war. This additional manpower can only be found through the expansion of current MSDF force levels. The costs for such a project would be staggering and since it would require major funding in peacetime, would face severe political opposition. Not only would procurement of the helicopters and support equipment require a massive initial outlay, the ongoing costs for routine maintenance and added personnel expenses are prohibitive.

F. SUMMARY

The historical record as well as the results of several studies seem to indicate that convoys are a more effective method of merchant ship protection than the use of barrier

or area search tactics. Of the many variations of convoys, it would also appear that escorted convoys utilizing some type of pulsed shipping is most promising.

Regarding the plans devised specifically for Japan, the economic measures proposed by Shilling and to a lesser extent, Sekino, seem to be fundamental to the success of any military solution. Although the plans under consideration all possess some measure of merit, they all contained serious shortfalls in their military feasibility. A common fault among all the plans is the failure to evaluate Soviet mine blockade of Japanese ports and sea-lanes. While the planners may have considered the 38 mine warfare ships of the MSDF, augmented by the smaller countermeasures craft of the Maritime Safety Agency, sufficient to keep the Japanese ports and harbors clear, it does not seem prudent to assume away such a vital consideration.

A second common weakness lies in the reliance each plan places on the blockade of the Sea of Japan straits and the ensuing attrition of Soviet submarines and surface craft in returning to port for rearming and refueling. The increasing use of Vietnamese harbors such as Danang, Cam Rahn Bay, and Haiphong by Soviet warships would seem to foreshadow their use as a logistics base in a wartime situation. In addition, Soviet advances in underway replenishment, as employed by the U.S., will, at least for their surface forces, eliminate the necessity for frequent port stops.

The final area of neglect comes in antiaircraft defenses. The proximity of Japan and her sea-lanes to Soviet mainland air bases, coupled with the proliferation of and technological advances in cruise missile technology, make Japanese convoys highly susceptible to interdiction from the air. Air defense capability of the MSDF is virtually nonexistent and shore-based air defenses have little at-sea capability.

The most feasible method of sea-lane protection for Japan would seem to be some method of escorted pulsed shipping. Minimum import levels could only be maintained, however, if military weaknesses are corrected. Improvements which must be undertaken as a minimum requirement would be: (1) increased minelaying capability, particularly in the procurement of minelaying aircraft; (2) continuing quantitative and qualitative improvements in the mine countermeasures force to offset a Soviet offensive mining campaign, and (3) significant improvements in air defenses both for convoy protection and for the defense of shore bases for ASW patrol aircraft.

VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR UNITED STATES' POLICY

Based on official statements from both military and political leaders and on an analysis of the trends and projections for MSDF procurement, it is quite evident that Japan is not actively engaged in developing a convoy escort capability. The current inventory of 59 escort-type ships falls far short of Hideo Sekino's convoy requirements of 96 ships.¹ Shilling's plan, which required only 50 ships, was calculated on five convoys of 60 ships with 10 escorts. We have seen that a revision of his estimates to reflect actual circumstances would require five convoys of 100 ships thereby increasing total escort requirements by about 32 ships to a total of 82.² In the face of these minimum force levels for convoy protection, Prime Minister Suzuki, in recent statements, announced that Japan will attain the NDP Outline strength level by 1987.³ He has further stated that there are no current plans to revise or update the Outline which calls for a total of 60 escort-type vessels for the MSDF.

An examination of warfare deficiencies that would have to be strengthened should the Japanese desire to attain a convoy escort capability reveals a level of inattention equal to that found in the quantitative analysis. One of the most serious deficiencies in Japanese convoy escort capability is an almost total lack of aircraft and missile defenses.

Only three ships are currently equipped with a medium-range anti-aircraft missile that could provide any measure of protection for convoy units. While all newer construction escort ships are being equipped with the short-range Sea Sparrow missile and a close-in weapon system, these will provide a self-defense capability only and will offer no protection to the escorted units. In addition, the medium-range systems that do exist are only marginally effective against low altitude, high-speed anti-shipping missiles because they were developed primarily to be used against larger, higher-flying targets. The most effective method of air defense for a convoy would be the development of carrier-based fighter protection, an option that has not even been seriously considered by the Japanese.

One area of significant development is the installation of Harpoon surface-to-surface missiles on several surface combatants. While this will give the MSDF a significant capability against enemy surface commerce raiders, without the parallel development of anti-air defenses, it would appear to be a fruitless effort. This development only seems logical in the context that the missiles are meant to be used as an anti-invasion force while remaining entirely under the cover of ground-based air support. In this role, the existing anti-aircraft capability could also be rationalized. As another alternative, with anti-ship missiles and anti-aircraft self-defense, the ships of the JMSDF would be suitably equipped

to combat the missile-equipped forces of any of the regional nations in the event of a highly localized conflict.

A second shortfall in Japan's convoy escort capability is her lack of logistics support for combat units away from their homeports. With only two oilers capable of providing underway refueling and only a marginal capability for underway rearming, the MSDF could not sustain convoy escort operations. Similarly, there are currently no plans to increase the logistics support mission in the near future.

Japan's submarine fleet consists of 14 units, eight of which are a modern design. While it is widely acknowledged that submarines are the most effective anti-submarine platforms, long range development of the MSDF calls only for the one-to-one replacement of existing units rather than any quantitative improvements. If the submarine is to be the primary anti-convoy weapon, it would only seem reasonable that a nation engaged in convoy defense preparations would make efforts to stem this particular threat.

In short, based on quantitative and qualitative analysis, the MSDF does not have the capability to effectively provide escort protection to merchant shipping destined for Japan in the event of a Soviet interdiction campaign. Moreover, in looking at long-range plans for building and for technical development, there is no indication that the Japanese will attempt to develop a convoy escort capability in the foreseeable future.

Japan does not believe it has the capability of militarily protecting its sea-lanes. Official statements are consistent in their declarations of having no intention of sea-lane control in the area of the Indonesian straits and they have consistently accepted ASW and convoy escort responsibility within their immediate sea area only with the cooperation of U.S. forces. As was noted earlier, Osamu Kaihara has been a longtime spokesman for the futility of convoy defense in the face of the Soviet threat.⁴ He believes that the vulnerability of the Japanese main islands, their ports and harbors, makes the question of sea-lane defense merely academic. He believes that even if Japan could thwart the USSR in a struggle for sea-lane control, the Soviet Union would then resort to annihilation of the Japanese infrastructure. Official documents also stress the futility of a Japanese effort to protect the sea-lanes as evidenced by the 1979 White Paper that expressed doubt that even the U.S. Seventh Fleet could prevent the Soviet Union from interdicting sea-lanes.⁵

This lack of confidence in Japan's military capability however, does not reflect their deep appreciation of the importance of the sea-lanes and imports to their economic survival. While there is no evidence that Japan has embarked on a program to militarily secure her sea-lanes, her efforts on the diplomatic front are widespread. The government and private industry are stockpiling strategic materials in order to minimize the effects of drastic price increases or temporary

interdiction. Increased emphasis on foreign investment and foreign loan programs have, along with an increase in foreign assistance programs, been geared toward promoting goodwill and cooperation between Japan and supplier nations. Sources of strategic materials are being diversified in a conscious effort to create and use monopsony techniques.

The Japanese have evaluated the Soviet threat as being primarily directed against the major islands. They have concluded that if interdiction of her sea-lanes is attempted, it will be a program directed either at the source of supply or at the terminal points, the harbors and bays of Japan. As such, the Japanese have concluded that economic and diplomatic efforts as outlined above, will be the most effective method of dealing with an interdiction campaign directed at the sources of supply. A campaign against the Japanese harbors and bays would be best served by maintaining their excellent mine countermeasures force in a high state of readiness and in concentrating other MSDF efforts to coastal defense and in controlling the strategic straits of the Sea of Japan. Soviet writing, specifically that of Admiral Gorshkov in Sea Power of the State, have consistently downplayed the role of sea-lane interdiction as a primary mission for the Soviet navy.⁶ Giving the Soviets credit for recognizing the vital importance of Japanese sea-lanes to the security of Japan and the U.S., one must assume that the Soviets have alternative methods in mind for stopping Japan's commerce. Two alternatives

are immediately obvious. The destruction of Japanese port facilities and harbors would effectively shut off all imports or the Soviets could, on the other hand, utilize a mine blockade of the harbors and shipping lanes. The Soviets have used mines effectively since the Crimean War and considering that their current inventory of naval mines is larger than that of the rest of the world combined, it would seem logical if that alternative were chosen.

The Japanese have been straightforward in stating the purposes and goals for the MSDF and have developed the MSDF toward those goals without deviation. The Defense White Paper of 1979 states that there has been no change in the basic premise of Japanese national defense policies from those adopted by Cabinet approval in 1957. The White Paper asserts that within this framework, the Defense Build-up Plans were "...aimed at building a defensive capability able to effectively meet the type of aggression on a scale no greater than localized conflict with conventional weapons." It also stated that the goal of the current guide for military procurement and development, the National Defense Program Outline, which is slated for attainment by 1987, is "To be capable of rebuffing cases of limited and small-scale aggression..."⁷ Sea-lane defense is only considered within the limited definition of the local "sea area" and then only with the assistance and cooperation of the U.S. Navy.

From the American point of view, this philosophy of defense is very difficult to understand. The American solution, upon recognizing a threat to their security, would be to counter that threat with equal or greater force. This difference in outlook has led to persistent U.S. requests for increases in the Japanese defense budgets and subsequent Japanese maneuvering to avoid the issue. The concept of a Comprehensive National Security Plan (CNSP), which is being promoted by the ruling Liberal-Democratic Party, is a good example. Amid U.S. requests for increases in the Japanese defense budget, the CNSP was developed to provide up to 5 percent of the GNP for security. (Defense spending is currently 0.9 percent of GNP.) Within the context of CNSP, however, security is defined in very broad terms and includes defense as one of its component parts. Programs which would be included in CNSP funding are economic aid, economic development programs, resource development, and cultural exchange programs. Defense spending would remain at under 1 percent of GNP. U.S. critics have labeled the plan as nothing more than a ploy to avoid increasing military spending. The fact that the CNSP actually represents what the Japanese consider to be the optimum solution to their security problems goes relatively unnoticed.

In his book Gunboat Diplomacy, James Cable explained that there are two basic levels of naval development.⁸ One must first build a navy that can provide some measure of defense

against aggression in local waters. By so doing, this navy will also be able to deter attempts at coercive diplomacy and political blackmail. This mission can be accomplished by a limited number of appropriately armed small combatants. To attain the next level in naval development, that of being able to combat a major naval power, one must make a quantum jump in numbers of ships, weapons, logistic and support facilities available for use. Any position on the middle ground is simply not cost effective because it provides more power than necessary to deal with harassment and coercive diplomacy, yet insufficient strength to counter a major assault.

The development of the Japanese navy in particular, and the Self-Defense Forces in general, seems to indicate that the Japanese goal is to remain as a small, defensive force. They have specifically forsaken the development of an offensive military capability in favor of building massive economic and industrial power. Through international trade and economic interdependence, the Japanese have attempted to create an atmosphere of economic deterrence designed to ensure a U.S. response to a threat to Japanese security. On the other hand, their industrial infrastructure considerably sweetens the pot if an aggressor could win a military or political victory without the physical destruction of the cities and industry. The term "Finnlandize" is much overused but should be considered as a realistic possibility in this case.

The United States is well aware of the potential threat to the Japanese sea-lanes but does not have sufficient forces to provide them adequate protection against Soviet interdiction, especially in the likelihood of wide-ranging conflict. The Nixon Doctrine is still very much in effect as evidenced by constant pressure on the Japanese to increase defense spending. This approach, however, has not been productive in the past and there is no reason to believe in its future success. The Japanese view these actions as being heavy-handed and blunt, causing a deterioration in relations. A different tactic is being pursued at the working levels which promises a more amicable, and from the U.S. point of view, more advantageous solution. Within the context of the 1978 Guidelines of Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, drafts of joint operation plans are being written, procedures for cooperation in intelligence and logistics support activities, and standard defense measures are being devised. It is this forum that should be used to expand Japan's defense responsibilities, not by addressing levels of defense spending, but by joint agreement as to the actions and responsibilities of each party in various threat scenarios. Once agreement is reached based on expected capabilities, the military procurement required to attain that capability can be left to the Japanese.

In the longer term, the United States must begin to understand the Japanese point of view toward security and defense. The Japanese may be persuaded to take a larger role in their

self-defense but they will not in the foreseeable future, cross the line to become a military superpower. U.S. policies should be aimed at dissolving any binding commitments to the security of Japan. The Mutual Security Treaty (MST) is a specific area where the United States should initiate steps to realign its security commitments to Japan. The Treaty, as a minimum, should be renegotiated to reduce U.S. obligations and should be abolished if possible.

From the U.S. standpoint, cancellation or revision of the MST would allow more flexibility for military and security planning by removing the absolute commitment to protect the Japanese home islands. While some writers argue that Japan is vital to U.S. security, if for nothing more than economic ties, in the event of widespread war, Japanese trade and economic well-being will be low on the list of U.S. priorities.

Although the abolition of the Mutual Security Treaty would be preferable from the U.S. point of view, a revision of the treaty may serve as a mutually acceptable step in policy evolution between the two nations. Because of the potential political damage and economic repercussions of abolishing the treaty, as was seen with Taiwan, an interim revision may be the only politically feasible course of action. A revised treaty should recognize the importance of Japanese security and should only commit U.S. forces when the best interests of the U.S. would be served.

As competition for dwindling resources becomes more and more competitive and Japanese interests in world trade and markets increase, the probability of the Japanese becoming involved in a conflict over resources increases. In its policy toward Japan, it is imperative, therefore, that the U.S. pursue a strategy which will provide maximum flexibility based on its national interests without the encumbrances of written or assumed obligations in non-vital matters.

The Japanese would undoubtedly resist revision or cancellation of the Mutual Security Treaty. From the security standpoint, any modification will reduce Japan's security guarantees and weaken their overall defense posture. It is unlikely that revisions to the MST would lead to increased political tension and to increased friction in economic relations and trade regulations. Recent public opinion surveys indicate that a substantial portion of the Japanese population do not believe the U.S. would come to Japan's aid in the event of an attack on Japan under the present security arrangement.

Renegotiation of the Mutual Security Treaty would further the perception of U.S. non-involvement and would highlight the need for Japan to assume unilateral responsibility for her own security. A resultant action may be the loss of U.S. basing privileges in Japan but this option is unlikely because it does not provide any clear benefit to Japan. In fact, by denying the U.S. base rights, the Japanese would be denying themselves a certain measure of security provided by the deterrence value of the U.S. presence.

Arguments have been made for renegotiating the Mutual Security Treaty to provide for reciprocal obligations in case of attack. This option, however, offers few benefits to either side and is therefore highly unlikely. The U.S. would gain a commitment for Japanese assistance if attacked but, in any general war situation, it would be difficult to imagine a scenario where the entirety of Japanese assets would not be required for the defense of the home islands. On the other hand, Japan would not gain any security assurances beyond those prescribed in the current treaty and, in fact, would increase the likelihood of conflict by linking itself with U.S. actions. At the same time, for Japan to agree to a treaty with reciprocal obligations, it would first have to revise the Constitution to permit forward deployment of military forces.

Cancellation or revision of the Mutual Security Treaty would bring diverse reactions from other Asian nations. Most nations would interpret the action as a lessening of U.S. interest and resolve in Asia. Southeast Asian nations, in general, would be moderately favorable, applauding an end to U.S. interference and may be more receptive to an increased Japanese role in the regional power balance. China's reaction would be generally unfavorable but would be couched entirely in terms of the impact on the military balance with the Soviet Union. South Korea would be highly critical of the action because of the linkages between Japan's security and

their own. Realizing that a primary political factor for justifying U.S. security commitments on the Korean peninsula is the security of Japan, the Republic of Korea would be concerned that a revision of U.S. commitments to Japan would lead to similar actions in Korea. North Korea, on the other hand, would welcome any reduction of U.S. military or political presence in northeast Asia. The Soviet Union would also approve of any lessening of U.S. involvement in the security affairs of Japan. In fact, the Soviet Union had previously used the disputed northern islands as an enticement to persuade Japan not to sign the 1960 Mutual Security Treaty.

United States' policies toward Japan following World War II were designed to encourage economic recovery without the added burden of having to divert development capital into defense projects. Now that Japan has emerged as an economic superpower with the world's third largest GNP, the United States should relinquish the responsibility for Japan's defense. United States' policies should provide maximum flexibility to pursue its national goals and should stress that the U.S. will exercise options only if clearly beneficial to the best interests of the nation.

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER II

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